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NOTE
INTESTATE SUCCESSION RIGHTS OF ADOPTED
CHILDREN: SHOULD THE STEPPARENT
EXCEPTION BE EXTENDED?
INTRODUCTION

Since the enactment of the first American adoption statute in
1851,1 adoption has become socially acceptable and widely practiced. 2 The goal of American adoption law is to promote the best
interests of the child.3 Adoption practices and laws are discretionary, giving caseworkers and judges the ability to promote the wel4
fare of the particular child involved in an adoption proceeding.
When an infant is adopted by strangers, 5 adoption law defines the
child's best interests as requiring the complete substitution of the
adoptive family for the natural 6 family. 7 This "fresh start" 8 enables
the adoptive family to integrate without disruption or interference
from the natural family. 9
Succession law, by contrast, is a system of fixed rules and is
largely nondiscretionary.10 Its primary goals are to distribute intestate estates according to the probable intentions of the typical deceTraditionally,
dent and to promote certainty of titles."
consanguinity, or blood relationships, determined inheritance
1 1851 Mass. Acts 815. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
2 Emilio S. Binavince, Adoption and the Law of Descent and Distribution: A Comparative
Study anda ProposalforModel Legislation, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 152, 153 (1966); Leo A. Huard,
The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743, 749 (1956); Fred L.
Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession By and From the Adopted Child, 28 WASH. U. L.Q. 221,247
(1943); Jan E. Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption and Association: Who Should Get What and
Why (The Impact of Adoptions, Adult Adoptions, and EquitableAdoptions on Intestate Succession
and Class Gifts), 37 VAND. L. Rv. 711, 712 (1984); see also Adoption in America, 1981: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1981)
(statement of Sen. Jepson) (estimating that 150,000 adoptions occur annually); NATIONAL COMMITrEE FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK 69 (1989) [hereinafter ADOPTION FAcTBooK] (indicating that the number of adoptions reached a peak of 175,000 in

1975 and have declined to 104,088 in 1986).
3 See infra text accompanying note 51.
4 See infra text accompanying note 51.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 60, 62.
6 The terms "natural" and "biological" generally "designate the parents who have
actually produced the child." JosEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF
THE CHILD 16 (1979).
7 See infra text accompanying notes 53-54.
8 See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
9 See infra text accompanying note 56.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 105, 298.
11 See infra text accompanying note 105.
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rights. 12 Because states assumed that an intestate decedent intended distribution of his estate only to his blood relatives, succession law has been slow to reflect adoption law's goal of completely
substituting the adoptive family for the adoptee's blood relations.1 3
Nevertheless, today's intestacy statutes do reflect this traditional adoption policy by severing adoptees' inheritance rights from
and through their natural parents.1 4 Many statutes, however, provide for an exception in the case of stepparent or other relative
adoption. 15 These "stepparent exceptions" generally provide that
in the case of a stepparent or other natural relative adoption, a
child's inheritance rights from and through the biological parents
remain intact. Such exceptions reflect a belief that stepparent adoptions involve factual circumstances and policy concerns which differ
from those involved in the traditional infant adoption by strangers. 1 6 Children in stepparent adoptions are likely to maintain conSee infra note 107 and accompanying text.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 115-40, 141-51; see also Stephen B. Presser, The
HistoricalBackground of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAm. L. 443, 510-14 (1971)
(suggesting that the hesitancy to change the preference for blood relations was not just
based on historical preference, but also resulted from conflicting views regarding the
nature of adopted children and from negative judicial reaction to the changes in form,
function, and the concept of family that were occurring in late 19th-century America).
14
See infra text accompanying notes 141-62.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 229-92. This Note focuses on the stepparent
exception; however, many other complex issues exist, which, though beyond the scope
of this Note, should be considered when analyzing the impact of adoption of succession
law. According to one commentator,
[i]n dealing with the impact of adoption on intestate succession, a well
considered statute should resolve the following questions: (1) Can the
adoptee and the adoptor inherit from each other? (2) Can the adoptee
inherit through the adoptor from the adoptor's kindred? (3) Can the
adoptor's kindred inherit from and through the adoptee? (4) Should the
adoptee's former ability to inherit from his biological parents and their
kindred retained or abolished? (5) Should the former ability of the biological parents and their kindred to inherit from the adoptee be retained
or abolished? (6) Should any of these questions be answered differently
in relative adoption cases when the adopter is either a stepparent or a
blood relative of the adoptee? (7) How should these questions be answered with respect to inheritance by, from, and through the descendants
of the adoptee? (8) Should these questions be answered differently with
respect to inheritance by, from, and through a person who is adopted as
an adult? (9) Assuming some inheritance rights are preserved between
an adoptee and his biological kindred, should an individual adopted by a
blood relative-for example, a natural grandparent-be allowed to inherit from and through the adopter in two capacities, once as an adoptive
and once as a natural relative? (10) In the case of successive adoptions,
should mutual inheritance rights be recognized between the adoptive
child and both sets of adoptive relatives?
Rein, supra note 2, at 718. See also 7 RICHARD R. PowELL, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 998[4] (PatrickJ. Rohan rev. ed. 1991).
16 See infra text accompanying notes 184-213. This Note will use the term "traditional adoption" to refer to the adoption of an infant by strangers and the term "nontraditional adoption" to refer to open adoptions (where the natural parents or other
12
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tact with biological relatives and, as a result, the fresh start policy is
17
inappropriate.
Recent developments in adoption law, such as the increased
number of older children adoptions,18 the emergence of open adoptions1 9 and postadoption visitation cases, 20 and changes concerning
the confidentiality of adoption, 2 1 also involve continued contact
with biological relatives. Research suggests that in these nontraditional adoption arrangements, as well as in stepparent and other relative adoptions, continuity of relationships with the natural family
may serve the child's best interests. 2 2 Therefore, states not only
should enact stepparent exceptions but also should extend these exceptions to analogous situations.
Although many state statutes contain a stepparent exception,
little consistency or uniformity exists regarding the structure and
scope of such exceptions. This inconsistency is unfortunate because
relative adoptions, including stepparent adoptions, constitute a
large number of the adoptions that take place each year. 23 Because
so many adoptions are affected and because these adoptions involve
different concerns than traditional adoptions, relative or stepparent
adoptions warrant separate treatment by state legislatures. 24 Legislatures should implement an approach to the stepparent exception
which best complements and furthers the modern goals of adoption
25
and succession law.

This Note examines the stepparent exception in detail. Part I
reviews the history of adoption and examines recent developments
in adoption law. 26 Part II reviews the treatment of adopted children
natural relatives maintain some contact with the child after adoption), adoptions of older
children, and other unusual adoption situations. This terminology is similar to that suggested by the National Committee For Adoption (NCFA). However, NCFA uses the
term "traditional" or "confidential" to refer to infant adoptions, even if birthparents
have the opportunity to participate in decisionmaking or child care planning, as long as
confidentiality is preserved. NCFA uses the term "experimental" to refer to other open
adoptions. ADOPTION FACTBOOK supra note 2, at 111.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 62-83.
18 See infra text accompanying notes 62-68.
19 "Open adoptions" are arrangements which provide for continued contact with
biological relatives. See infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
21
See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
23
See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
24 Rein, supra note 2, at 728; Timothy Hughes, Note, Intestate Succession and Stepparent Adoptions: Should Inheritance Rights of an Adopted Child be Determined by Blood or by Law?,
1988 Wis. L. REv. 321, 341 (1988); Barbara C. Quissel, Note, Adoption-Intestate Succession-The Denial of a StepparentAdoptee's Right to Inheritfrom an Intestate NaturalGrandparent.
In Re Estate of Holt, 13 N.M. L. REv. 221, 222 n.5 (1983).
25

See infra text accompanying notes 103-62.

26

See infra notes 31-102 and accompanying text.
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under intestacy statutes, both historically and currently. 2 7 Part III
evaluates the policy arguments for and against exceptions for stepparent and other relative adoptions and examines the various approaches states have taken when enacting these exceptions. Part III
also determines the extent to which these approaches further the
goals of adoption and succession law28 and concludes that Pennsylvania's discretionary approach, which makes the preservation of
inheritance rights contingent on the natural relative maintaining a
family relationship with the child, reaches the most desirable results. 29 Finally, Part IV suggests modifications to the Pennsylvania
approach to further the goals of adoption and succession law.3 0
I
ADOPTMON LAWS AND PRACrICES

Understanding the historical development of adoption, and recent developments in adoption practices, is critical to understanding
the treatment of adopted children under past and present succession laws. 3 1 Traditionally, the "typical" adoption involved adoption
of an infant by strangers, and adoption practices and laws have developed in light of this traditional scenario. 32 However, the nature
of adoption has changed over the years. Today, the "typical" adoption involves the adoption of an older child by a stepparent, other
relatives, or perhaps foster parents.3 3 Not surprisingly, given the
changing nature of adoption, some authorities have suggested that
adoption practices should change in order to further the best inter34
ests of the child in such situations.
A.

History of Adoption

Adoption law, unlike most American laws, did not derive from
English common law.3 5 Although informal adoption practices exis27 See infra notes 103-62 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 163-292 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 284-92 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 293-99 and accompanying text.
31 For brief treatment of this topic, see Binavince, supra note 2, at 154-55;
Kuhlmann, supra note 2, at 222-24; Rein, supra note 2, at 714-17. For more detailed
treatment, see Huard, supra note 2, at 743-53; Presser, supra note 13. For a judicial
summary of the history of adoption, see Hockaday v. Lynn, 98 S.W. 585 (Mo. 1906).
32 See Sol Lovas, When is the Family Not a Family? Inheritanceand the Taxation of Inheritance Within the NontraditionalFamily, 24 IDAHo L. REv. 353, 358 (1987-88); Rein, supra

note 2, at 728; Susan F. Koffman, Comment, StepparentAdoption: A ComparativeAnalysis of
Law and Policies in England and the United States, 7 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 463, 476

(1984).
33 See infra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 69-102 and accompanying text.
35 Adoption has ancient roots. The Babylonian Code of Hammurabi and the laws
of Greece, Egypt, and Rome all recognized adoption. Huard, supra note 2, at 743-44.
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ted,3 6 England did not legally recognize adoption until the Adoption of Children Act in 1926.37 One informal adoption practice,
known as "putting out," involved sending a child to live with another family for more objective discipline and training.3 8
A similar practice developed in America, where the "putting
out" system was modified and used for the placement of orphans
with relatives.3 9 Children with no relatives were apprenticed if old
enough, or were placed with almshouses for sustenance and educa40
tion until they could be apprenticed or placed with a family.
Although little effort was made to find suitable homes for these children, a few were fortunate enough to be placed with caring families
who wanted to formalize the arrangement.4 1 These families had to
obtain private decrees, which usually involved only changing the
child's name. Occasionally, however, these decrees specified that
the adoptees would receive inheritance rights from the adoptive
42
parents.
During the nineteenth century when the industrial revolution
brought urban poverty and numerous immigrants, many of these informal child placement systems broke down. 43 Child placement orHowever, the fullest accounts of ancient adoption practice come from Rome. Id at 744;
Presser, supra note 13, at 446. Roman adoption had two purposes: to prevent extinction
of a particular family line and to insure a male heir to perpetuate ceremonial worship of
ancestors. Ruth-Arlene Howe, Adoption Practice,lssues, andLaws 1958-1983, 27 FAm. L.Q.
173, 174-75 (Summer 1983). Adopted persons, therefore, were usually adult males, and
the focus was on the needs of the adoptive family, not on those of the adoptee. Huard,
supra note 2, at 743-45; Kuhlmann, supra note 2, at 222; Presser, supra note 13, at 44548. Originally Roman law severed all of the adoptee's ties, including inheritance rights,
to his natural family. See Huard, supra note 2, at 743-45. However, later Roman law
provided that the adoptee retained inheritance rights from his natural father. Howe,
supra at 174-75; Presser, supra note 13, at 446. Nevertheless, the purpose of adoption
was still to benefit the adopter. This emphasis on the needs of the adopter continued in
civil law countries long after religious overtones faded. Binavince, supra note 2, at 154;
Kuhlmann, supra note 2, at 222; Rein, supra note 2, at 714.
36
For a discussion of these informal practices, as well as the reasons that the common law did not incorporate adoption, see Binavince, supra note 2, at 155 n.11 and
accompanying text; Huard, supra note 2, at 745-47; Presser, supra note 13, at 448-55.
37
16 & 17 Geo. 5, ch. 29 (Eng.).
38
Presser, supra note 13, at 453-56.
39 See Rein, supra note 2, at 715.
40 See Presser, supra note 13, at 457-59, 472. For a detailed discussion of various
functions served by apprenticeships, see MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH
259-68 (1985).
41 See Presser, supra note 13, at 458-61; Rein, supra note 2, at 715 n.14.
42 Presser, supra note 13, at 461-64; Rein, supra note 2, at 715-16.
43 Rein, supra note 2, at 716. See also GROSSBERG, supra note 40, at 271 ("A
favorable climate for the institution of adoption emerged in mid-nineteenth century
America as a result of the problems associated with other forms of child placement, the
gradual refinement of nurture-based custody law, confusion over inheritance rights, and
the everpresent plight of homeless, neglected, and delinquent children."). For a detailed analysis of the changing economic and social conditions during this time and the
effect of such changes on child placement activities, see Presser, supra note 13, at 447-89.
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ganizations were overwhelmed with homeless children and many
children were exploited as cheap labor.44 Eventually this exploitation attracted the attention of Christian reformers, 4 5 and religious
placement agencies began to place young children in homes where
they would be treated as family members, not servants. 46 With an
increase in the number of families seeking formal arrangements,
47
legislatures began to pass general adoption statutes.
Massachusetts enacted the first American adoption statute in
1851,48 and in the next twenty-five years, twenty-four states enacted
49
similar statutes, most modeled after the Massachusetts statute.
The language of these early statutes indicates that the purpose of
adoption was to promote the welfare of the child. 50 This focus on
the welfare of the child has continued to the present. For example,
modem adoption statutes provide that the applicable standard for
adoption decisions is the "best interests of the child." 5 1 In addition,
these statutes usually require the consent of the natural parents, investigation of the potential home and screening of the prospective
parents, a probationary trial period, and a final judicial decree
52
before an adoption is approved.
For the past century, society's view of the adoptee's best interests has required the child's complete assimilation into the adoptive
family. 53 All ties to biological parents and other relatives must be
44

Rein, supra note 2, at 716. See also

HOMER

FoLKs,

GLECTED, AND DELINQUENT CHILDREN 64-69 (1971).
45
Presser, supra note 13, at 480-82; Rein, supra note

THE CARE OF DESTTrE,

NE-

2, at 716.
Presser, supra note 13, at 482-88.
47
Presser, supra note 13, at 477, 488-89; Rein, supra note 2, at 716 n.21.
48
1851 Mass. Acts 815. See Presser, supra note 13, at 465; Rein, supra note 2, at
716; see also Huard, supra note 2, at 748 (discussing the dispute over which state enacted
the first adoption statute and concluding that the Massachusetts statute is generally regarded as the first comprehensive statute).
49
Howe, supra note 35, at 176; Presser, supra note 13, at 443, 465-70; Jamil S.
Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the
Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1038, 1043 (1979).
50 Binavince, supra note 2, at 155; Howe, supra note 35, at 177; Huard, supra note 2,
at 748-49; Kuhlmann, supra note 2, at 223; Rein, supra note 2, at 717. See, e.g., 1851
Mass. Acts 816 (granting the probate judge the authority to approve an adoption when
satisfied that the petitioners are "of sufficient ability to bring up the child, and furnish
suitable nurture and education."). This focus on the welfare of the child contrasted
sharply with the ancient adoption laws, which emphasized the needs of the adoptive
family. See supra note 35.
51
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-1OA-25(b)(6) (West Supp. 1991); see also Katharine T.
Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthoodas an Exclusive Status: The Needfor Legal Alternatives When the
Premise of the Nuclear Family has Failed,70 VA. L. REV. 879, 890 (1984); Howe, supra note
35, at 176-77, 185; Huard, supra note 2, at 749-50.
52
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-IOA-25 (West Supp. 1991); see also Howe, supra note 35,
at 178; Rein, supra note 2, at 717.
53
Sanford N. Katz, Rewriting the Adoption Story, 5 FAM. ADvoc. 9 (Summer 1982);
Kuhlmann, supra note 2, at 248; Rein, supra note 2, at 717, 729.
46
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severed to give the child a "fresh start" as a member of a new family. 5 4 This fresh start permits the adoptive family to integrate without disruption or interference from the biological family, 55 and
reduces any stigma or rejection that the adopted child might
experience. 5 6
To accomplish complete separation from the natural family,
"secrecy has been the hallmark of the adoptive process. '5 7 Most
states seal adoption records and alter birth certificates to preserve
birth parent confidentiality and to prevent the natural relatives from
interfering with the adoptive family. 5 8 In addition, past adoption
practices attempted to imitate nature by placing adoptees with families possessing similar physical characteristics. 5 9
During the time that these practices developed, most adoptions
occurred when an unwed mother relinquished custody of her child
for adoption, often the only socially acceptable alternative. 60 However, adoption practices and society's views of adoption have
changed during the past twenty-five years.6 1 The next section examines the tremendous impact these changes have had on adoption law
and the treatment of adopted children under intestacy statutes.
54 Katz, supra note 53, at 10; Rein, supra note 2, at 717. Forjudicial recognition of
the fresh start policy, see In re Estates of Donnelly, 502 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wash. 1972)
("The question at bench should... be decided in the context of the broad legislative
objective of giving the child a 'fresh start' by treating him as the natural child of the
adoptive parent, and severing all ties with the past."); Crumpton v. Mitchell, 281 S.E.2d
1, 5 (N.C. 1981):
[T]he legislature contemplated that upon a final order of adoption a complete substitution of families would take place with the adopted child becoming the child of his adoptive parents and a member of their family;
likewise, the legal relationship with the child's natural parents and family
would... be completely severed.
55 Bartlett, supra note 51, at 894; Rein, supra note 2, at 717, 729.
56 Rein, supra note 2, at 717.
57 Howe, supra note 35, at 190.
58 Id. at 190-91; Rein, supra note 2, at 729; Debra D. Poulin, The Open Adoption
Records Movement. ConstitutionalCases and Legislative Compromise, 26 J. F~A. L. 395, 397-98
(1987-88).
59 For the past century, our adoption laws and practices have followed the
Roman legal tradition of attempting to make law mirror biology. This
tradition was based on the notion that the adopted child, by physical appearance alone, could have been the birth child of the adoptive parents.
The adoptive parents were supposed to be people who, by appearance
and age, could have conceived the infant. Thus, adoption laws were
designed to imitate nature.
Katz, supra note 53, at 9. See also GOLDSTEIN Er AL., supra note 6, at 23 ("Adoptive parents frequently wish that the adopted child will grow up in their own image, an attitude
which may be reflected in statutory and adoption agencies' attempts to have children
'matched' with prospective adopters so far as physical features, social background, and
possible hereditary endowment are concerned.").
60 Katz, supra note 53, at 9.
61
Howe, supra note 35, at 173.
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Recent Developments in Adoption

In recent years, the number of "traditional" adoptions-where
an unwed mother relinquishes custody of her infant for adoption by
strangers-has declined, while adoptions of older children have increased. 62 This is partly attributed to other societal changes, such
as the greater availability of birth control and abortion, 63 and less
social stigma for unwed mothers who choose to keep their children.6 4 As a result, these changes have decreased the number of
infants available for adoption. 65 In addition, rising rates of divorce
and remarriage 66 have increased the number of stepparent adop62
63

See Katz, supra note 53, at 9.
JEROME SMITH & FRANKLIN I. MIROFF, YOU'Rz OUR CHILD: THE ADOPTION EXPE-

RIENCE 4 (1987); Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law
and Proposalsfor Legislative Change, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 10, 13 (1975); Howe, supra note 35,
at 180-8 1; Judy E. Nathan, Note, Visitation After Adoption: In the Best Interests of the Child, 59
N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 633, 635 (1984).
64 SMITH & MIROFF, supra note 63, at 4; see also Carol Amadio & Stuart L. Deutsch,
Open Adoption: Allowing Adopted Children to "Stay in Touch" with Blood Relatives, 22J. FAM. L.
59, 71 (1983-84); Bodenheimer, supra note 63, at 13; Howe, supra note 35, at 180-81.
The National Committee For Adoption has identified nine social trends that not only
have affected the potential number of adoptable children, but also caused adoption to
be viewed as a less favorable option. These are: (1) the decision of more single mothers
to parent their babies; (2) the decreased stigma of out-of-wedlock childbearing; (3) the
increased number of households headed by women (providing role models for pregnant
teenagers and possibly causing these teenagers not to consider adoption seriously); (4)
the legalization of abortion; (5) continued infertility, which has resulted in the number
of prospective adoptive couples greatly outnumbering the number of adoptable children; (6) the Title IX requirement that schools offer "mainstream" schooling to pregnant young women (resulting in less privacy and greater reluctance to consider adoption
because many women are unwilling to return to school after childbirth without a baby);
(7) state requirements of notification to the putative father about the mother's intention
to relinquish custody of the baby; (8) an inadequate number of comprehensive maternity
homes; and (9) the new wave of adoption agencies and services that occurred during the
1980s. ADOMoN FACTBooK, supra note 2, at 12-14. See also Paul Taylor, Unwed White
Mothers Seem Much Less Likely Now to Offer BabiesforAdoption, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1992, at
All (noting that the number of adoption relinquishments by white mothers has continued to decline even though the number of abortions has leveled off, and concluding that
"the principal cause of the decline in adoptions is not legal but cultural. It reflects the
destigmatization of out-of-wedlock child-rearing in a society where 27 percent of all children are born out of wedlock, four times the percentage of just 25 years ago.").
65 Bodenheimer, supra note 63, at 13; Nathan, supra note 63, at 635. For a discussion of other effects of the decreasing number of available infants, see Bodenheimer,
supra note 63, at 15-16 ("The situation is fraught with danger for children who run the
risk of becoming 'commodities' on the market or pawns shifted around to satisfy agency
waiting lists .... ); Howe, supra note 35, at 181 ("Prospective adoptive parents now were
faced with interminably long waits or were offered older children with 'special
needs'....").
66 See Bodenheimer, supra note 63, at 13. Recent research predicts that approximately two-thirds of all first marriages will end in divorce. See Teresa C. Martin & Larry
L. Bumpass, Recent Trends in MaritalDisruption, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 37, 49 (1989). In addition, approximately one out of three persons who marry has been previously married.
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., PUB. No. 89-01923, REMARRIAGES AND SUBSEQUENT DIVORCES-UNITED STATES 1-2 (1989). See also STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE

1196

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1188

tions, which usually involve older children. 6 7 Finally, the number of
foster children adoptions, which also involve older children, has
68
also increased.
Accompanying these changes in adoption practices is a growing
recognition that a fresh start, with its corresponding severance of
ties to the natural family, may not always be in the best interests of
an older child.6 9 Older children have memories of their natural
families 70 and are likely to have established "affection relations"
with them. 7 ' Some researchers have concluded that "actual severUNrED STATES 85 (1989) (45.8% of all marriages in 1985 involved persons remarrying).
For statistics on stepparent adoptions, see infra note 164.
67
See Nathan, supra note 63, at 635 n.20; see also Quisell, supra note 24, at 230. But
see David L.Chambers, Stepparents,BiologicParents, and the Law's Perceptionsof "Family" after
Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 118-19 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma
H. Kay eds., 1990) (noting that little is known about the impact or pattern of stepparent
adoptions and that "[w]e do not even know whether stepparent adoptions are increasing
in frequency.").
68
Bodenheimer, supra note 63, at 37; Howe, supra note 35, at 188-89; see also Katz,
supra note 53, at 9; Nathan, supra note 63, at 635; see generally Barriersto Adoption: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (discussing the adoption policies and practices which keep children trapped in foster care
even though they are legally free for adoption); U.S. Children and Their Families: Current
Conditions andRecent Trends, 1987,A Report Together With Additional Views of the U.S. House of
Representatives Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 25
(1987) (In 1984 over a quarter of a million children were in foster or substitute care.
Approximately 19,000-21,000 children were adopted during the year. Of these, 11%
were less than one year old; 41% were between one and five years old; 34% were between 6 and 12 years old; 12% were between 13 and 18 years old; less than 1% were 19
years of age or older).
69 As explained by one authority,
[a]pplicants need to face the fact that this experience is different in many
ways from that of adopting a baby, that the emotional factors are different
both for themselves and for the child. In order to guide and support
both parents and children, the caseworker needs to come to grips with
this essential difference, and to broaden his own concept of adoption as
something that may include a structure vastly different from that of infant
adoption.
Velma Bell, Special Considerationsin the Adoption of the Older Child, 40 Soc. CASEwoRx 327,
333 (1959). See also Bartlett, supra note 51, at 905-11 (also discussing the different considerations involved in the adoption of older children).
70 See Bell, supra note 69, at 329 ("Most important of all the differences between
adopting an infant and adopting an older child ...is the older child's involvement with
his past life."); see also Katz, supra note 51, at 10. In some cases, the memories may not
be of natural relatives, but of previous caretakers, such as foster parents. Some have
suggested that ties to these caretakers should be continued as well. See Bartlett, supra
note 51, at 881-83.
71
An "affection relation" refers to a child's psychological relationship with an important person in her life. It serves as a prototype for all future interpersonal relationships. Note, Alternatives to "ParentalRight" in Child Custody Dispute Involving Third Parties,
73 YALE LJ. 151, 160-62 (1963); see also GOLDSTEIN r AL., supra note 6, at 17-20 (discussing psychological parent-child relationships). In explaining the concept of a "psychological parent," one authority stated that
[w]hether any adult becomes the psychological parent of a child is based
thus on day to day interaction, companionship and shared experiences.
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ance of an older child's emotional bonds with natural relatives can
psychologically harm her and make it more difficult for her to develop psychological relationships with members of her adoptive
family." 72 As a result, many suggest that the child's best interests
require continued contact with these natural relatives. 73
Although the traditional assumption is that such contact will
disrupt the adoptive family,7 4 research has shown that "[fiar from
undermining the adoptive relationship, his keeping in touch with his
relatives often strengthens it; the child knows that his adopting parents accept not only him but that which belongs to him and thus
acceptance has a broader, surer meaning. 7 5 Children who maintain contact with natural relatives experience greater feelings of permanence and stability, and as a result are more confident and better
76
able to adjust to new surroundings and new parents.
Other researchers, however, have observed that at least with respect to stepparent adoptions, "almost no information is available
about actual patterns of [such adoptions] in this country or about
the impact of adoption on the relationships between stepparents
and children."'7 7 Because "distressingly little" is known about these
adoptions, 78 and no social consensus on the appropriate role of
stepparents exists,7 9 at least one researcher has suggested that it is
80
premature to draft laws regulating these relationships.
The role can be fulfilled either by a biological parent or by an adoptive
parent or by any other caring adult-but never by an absent, inactive
adult, whatever his biological or legal relationship to the child may be.
Id at 19.
72

Nathan, supra note 63, at 661; see also GoLDSTmI Er AL.., supra note 6, at 18 ("Such

primitive and tenuous first attachments form the base from which any further relationships develop.").
73 Bartlett, supra note 51, at 902, 905, 907-08; see also GoLDsrExN ET AL., supra note
6, at 31-32 ("Continuity of relationships, surroundings, and environmental influence are
essential for a child's normal development.");JuDrrH S. WALLERSTEIN &JOAN B. KELLY,
SURVIVING THE BREAKUP 307-11 (1980) (five year study of children after divorce indicates
that contact with both parents helps children adjust psychologically); Emily B. Visher &
John S. Visher, Legal Action is No Substitutefor Genuine Relationships, 4 Fum. Anvoc. 35, 36
(1981) ("[A]djustment of children to the remarriage and acceptance of a stepparent are
more likely to be facilitated if contact with both biological parents is maintained."). But
see Nicholas Zill, Behavior, Achievement, and Health Problems Among Children in Stepfamilies:
Findings From a NationalSurvey of Child Health, in IMPACr OF DIVORCE, SINGLE PARENTING,
AND STEPPAREN-ING ON CHILDREN 363 (E. Mavis Hetherington &Josephine D. Arasteh
eds., 1988) (finding limited support for the hypothesis that stepchildren who had regular
contact with noncustodial biological parents would experience less difficulties).
74 Bartlett, supra note 51, at 908.
75 Bell, supra note 69, at 333-34; see also Bartlett, supra note 51, at 909.
76 Nathan, supra note 63, at 661-62; see also Bartlett, supra note 51, at 909-10 (discussing the psychological benefits of continued contact).
77 Chambers, supra note 67, at 102, 118.
78 Id at 119.
79 Id at 126.
80 Id at 129.
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In relative and stepparent adoptions, the adoptee usually maintains at least minimal contact with his natural relatives. 8 1 In recent
years, unusual arrangements designed to maintain this contact in
other adoption situations have emerged.8 2 Adoption arrangements
that provide for contact between the child and his natural family are
generally referred to as "open adoptions." 8 3
Open adoptions can occur by informal arrangement between
natural and adoptive families or by formal agreements sanctioned
by the courts.8 4 Not all open adoptions are alike. Some arrangements provide only that the natural family will receive photographs
and regular reports about the child.8 5 Other arrangements provide
86
for regular contact between the child and his natural relatives.
Open adoption is more acceptable when it maintains pre-existing ties with natural relatives, because this gives the child a sense
of continuity and permanence. 8 7 However, open adoptions some81

See Katz, supra note 53, at 10.
In addition to the psychological benefit of maintaining contact with natural relatives, proponents of open adoption suggest that these arrangements benefit the adoptee
in other ways. For example, traditional adoption law forces a court either to approve an
adoption, thereby severing all ties to the natural family, or deny an otherwise desirable
adoption in order to preserve such ties. See Nathan, supra note 63, at 646-47, 656; see
also Amadio & Deutsch, supra note 64, at 60; cf Bodenheimer, supra note 63, at 43-44,49
(suggesting that judges should have the authority to decree custody or guardianship
when adoption is denied to relieve them "of the often agonizing choice between adoption and return to a parent"). Open adoption, on the other hand, provides the court
with the opportunity to approve an adoption and preserve contact with natural relatives
thereby giving the child a sense of permanency. The opportunity to maintain contact
with the child may also encourage natural parents to consent to an adoption when they
might not otherwise. Natural parents who realize that they are unable to care for the
child properly but who are unwilling to sever all contact, may consent to an open adoption instead of placing the child in foster care. See Amadio & Deutsch, supra note 64, at
63; Nathan, supra note 63, at 659.
83 "Open adoption" is a concept of the 1980s that represents a new idea
about adoption. It is the antithesis of the Roman ideal-it does not seek
to imitate nature and makes no attempt to be a fiction. The essence of
open adoption is to provide the child with the opportunity to maintain
ties with his or her biological family.
Katz, supra note 53, at 10; see also Amadio & Deutsch, supra note 64, at 60.
84 See Amadio & Deutsch, supra note 64, at 60; Katz, supra note 53, at 10; see also
MODEL STATE ADOPTION Acr § 104(c) (1980); Official Comments, 45 FED. REG. 10,654
(1980) ("Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prevent the adoptive parents, the
birth parents and the child from entering into a written agreement, approved by the
court, to permit continuing contact of the birth relatives with the child or his adoptive
parents."). Later versions of the Model Act deleted the reference to open adoptions.
Amadio & Deutsch, supra note 64, at 61 n.6.
85 ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 2, at I 11; Amadio & Deutsch, supra note 64, at
84.
86 ADOPTION FACBOOK,supra note 2, at 11; Amadio & Deutsch, supra note 64, at
84.
87 See Nathan, supra note 63, at 665 (discussing visitation after adoption and stating
that "[t]he goal of visitation is to encourage and preserve a relationship, not to start a
new one.").
82
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times preserve contact in traditional adoptions when no relationship
currently exists between the adoptee and the natural relatives.8 8 In
such cases, open adoption is controversial "because it challenges
the basic goal of adoption-to accomplish a complete transplant of a
child from the birth family to the adoptive family."8 9 Nevertheless,
courts have approved open adoptions, which permit continued contact between siblings. 90 In addition, courts have awarded visitation
rights to grandparents even, in a few rare cases, over the objections
of the adoptive parents. 9 '
Finally, adoption laws concerning confidentiality have also
changed. "Sealed record statutes prohibit anyone, including the
adoptee, the adoptive parents and the birth parents, from obtaining
access to adoption records. '9 2 An individual can petition the court
to open the records for good cause, but most courts are reluctant to
grant such requests.9 3 The purpose of this strict confidentiality is
not only to protect the adoptee and adoptive parents from intrusion
88 See ADOPTION FAcTBooK, supra note 2, at 111 and Amadio & Deutsch, supra note
64 (both describing open adoption arrangements in which contact is maintained between the child and his natural relatives, even when the child is adopted as an infant).
89 Katz, supra note 53, at 10.
90 Amadio & Deutsch, supra note 64, at 66; see In re Adoption of Anthony, 448
N.Y.S.2d 377, 380-81 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1982) (finding that an adopted child's continued
contact, including visitation, with his natural siblings was necessary to further the best
interests of the child). For detailed discussions on post-adoption visitation, see Bartlett,
supra note 51, at 933-39; Phyllis C. Borzi, Note, Statutory Visitation Rights of Grandparents:
One Step Closer to the Best Interests of the Child, 26 CATm. U. L. Rv. 387 (1977); Miriam B.
Chaloff, Note, Grandparents'Statutory Visitation Rights and the Rights of Adoptive Parents,49
BROOKLYN L. REV. 149 (1982); Nathan, supra note 63.
91 Amadio & Deutsch, supra note 64, at 67-68; Bartlett, supra note 51, at 938. Almost all states have enacted statutes enabling grandparents and other relatives to petition for visitation rights. See Nathan, supra note 63, at 638. Initially, these statutes
authorized visitation only after the death of a natural parent. See id. at 639; Chaloff, supra
note 90, at 165-66. However, some courts have held that an adoption statute, which
usually severs all ties to the natural family, does not automatically override the visitation
statute. See Nathan, supra note 63, at 642-43. These courts will grant visitation rights
after adoption if it is in the best interests of the child. Id. at 645. The court's decision
often turns on the willingness of the adoptive parents to agree to visitation. Id at 64546. However, the court in In re Adoption of Children by F., 406 A.2d 986 (NJ. 1979),
granted visitation to the natural father even though the natural mother and stepfather
did not agree to such visitation. Similarly, in People ex re. Sibley v. Sheppard, 429
N.E.2d 1049, 1052 (N.Y. 1981), the New York Court of Appeals concluded that
"[p]ermitting grandparent visitation over the adoptive parents' objection does not unconstitutionally impinge upon the integrity of the adoptive family." See also People ex reL
Simmons v. Sheridan, 414 N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979), aff'd, 429 N.E.2d 1049
(N.Y. 1981); Roquemore v. Roquemore, 80 Cal. Rptr. 432 (Cal. 1969) (court should not
have dismissed grandparents' petition for visitation rights without allowing them the
opportunity to show that visitation was in the best interests of the child.).
92
Poulin, supra note 58, at 396.
93
Id. See also Melissa Arndt, Comment, Severed Roots: The Sealed Adoption Records
Controversy, 6 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 103, 105, 116-21 (1986).
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and interference, but also to protect the privacy of the natural
94
parents.
In recent years, adoptees have raised constitutional challenges
to sealed records laws and pushed state legislatures to address their
concerns. 95 These challenges claim that sealed records:
(1) violate the fourteenth amendment by infringing a fundamental
right (i.e., impair the right of privacy, which includes the right to
know one's origins); (2) violate the equal protection clause by creating a suspect class (i.e., deprive adoptees of an information right
that non-adoptees have); (3) violate the first amendment penumbral right to receive information (i.e., prevent adoptees from obtaining birth information); and (4) violate the thirteenth
amendment (i.e., impose a statutory barrier to birth parent infor96
mation, a "badge or incident" of slavery).
97
Courts have rejected all of these challenges.
Adoptees have also lobbied state legislators for adoption law
reform. As a result of these efforts, more than twenty states have
98
established the Voluntary Mutual Consent Adoption Registry.
Adoptees and natural parents can register their desire to meet each
other. When matches are made, meetings are arranged or identifying information is released. 99
The open records movement is controversial, and approximately twenty states still adhere to the strict confidentiality rule. 0 0
Nevertheless, adoptees continue to strive for change in this area.
The states that relax confidentiality requirements usually do so for
adoptees that have reached the age of majority.' 0 ' Nevertheless, to
the extent that this movement results in contact between adoptees
94 Poulin, supra note 58, at 397; see also ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 2, at 44;
Arndt, supra note 93, at 105.
95 Poulin, supra note 58, at 395. Two forces caused change in this area of law. The
first force was a group of "highly visible individuals" who founded support groups such
as the Adoptees Liberty Movement Association (ALMA), which pursued constitutional
challenges, and Concerned United Birthparents (CUB), which lobbied state legislatures.
The second force emerged from the field of social work, and proposed that nonidentifying information be provided to adopted adults and that meetings be arranged between
adoptees and natural parents when such a meeting was mutually desired. 14 FAM. L.

REP. 3017 (1988).
96
97
98

Poulin, supra note 58, at 398 (citations omitted).
Id. at 398-99 (footnotes omitted); see also Arndt, supra note 93, at 109-10.
ADOPtiON FACTBOOK, supra note 2, at 44; 14 FAM. L. REP. 3019 (1988).

99

ADOPTION FAcBOOK, supra note 2, at 44. Several states have laws that provide

for a search for the natural parent in order to obtain consent for a meeting. 14 FAM. L.
REP. at 3019. A few states provide for open records and allow an adoptee to obtain his
original birth certificate on demand. ADOPrION FACTBOOK, supra note 2, at 55 (indicating
that, as of 1988, Alabama, Alaska, and Kansas had such provisions). Finally, approximately twenty states adhere to traditional sealed records laws. Id.
100 See ADOPTION FACTBOOK, supra note 2, at 55.
101

Id. at 44.
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and their natural parents, it indicates a relaxation of the fresh start
policy.
Although open adoption and post-adoption visitation arrangements are still unusual, and widespread relaxation of strict confidentiality of adoption records has not yet occurred, it appears that such
developments will continue. Unusual arrangements may become
more popular, particularly if sociological and psychological research
continues to indicate that these practices further the adoptees' best
interests.10 2 Thus, legislatures contemplating changes to the adoption statutes, including intestacy provisions, should thoroughly and
sensitively evaluate these issues.
II
TREATMENT OF ADOPTED CHILDREN UNDER INTESTACY
STATUTES

Commentators regard the development of intestate succession
legislation concerning the rights of adopted children as "spasmodic
and piecemeal" 1 0 3 and "sadly disorganized."' 4 This haphazard development is not surprising because legislation concerning
adoptees' inheritance rights requires reconciliation of two areas of
law-succession and adoption law. Succession law is a system of
fixed rules designed to dispose of a decedent's estate according to
the probable intentions of the typical decedent, while simultaneously promoting certainty of titles, facilitating estate administration,
and achieving uniformity at a low cost. 10 5 Because the actual intent
of an intestate decedent is unknown, courts and legislatures have
06
had to infer intent when establishing the rules of succession law.
102 Borzi, supra note 90, at 399 (noting that psychologists concerned with preserving
the child's pre-existing relationships are "advocating a complete reevaluation of the
standards used in child placement and custody decisions").
103 Kuhlmann, supra note 2, at 227.
104 Rein, supra note 2, at 720; see also PowEL., supra note 15, at 90-84 ("The result is
a disconcerting and wholly unjustifiable lack of uniformity in the laws of the states.");
Paul A. Kiefer, Comment, Intestate Succession, Sociology and the Adopted Child, 11 I LL. L.
REv. 392, 395 (1966) ("Granting the statutory right of inheritance from the adoptive
parents and relatives to the adopted child and the consequent denial of the child's right
to inherit from his natural parents and relatives has been a very slow and confused process."). For a contrary view, see Huard, supra note 2, at 750 ("The effect of adoption
and the problem of inheritance by and from the adopted child are, in most places, no
longer subject to doubt. The disposition of these and other questions has been attended with a surprising degree of uniformity from state to state.").
105 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 1-102, 8 U.L.A. 24-25 (1983); Binavince, supra note 2, at
157; Mary L. Fellows et al., PublicAttitudes About PropertyDistribution at Death and Intestate
Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 319, 323-24; see generally
MAX RHEINSTEIN

&

MARY ANN GLENDON, THE LAW OF DECEDENT'S ESTATES

24 (1971)

("The legislative will ought to coincide with the probable wishes of the majority of
people who die intestate.").
106 Fellows et al., supra note 105, at 321, 324.
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Historically, courts and legislatures assumed that the typical decedent desired a distribution of the intestate estate based on princi10 7

ples of consanguinity.

By contrast, adoption law, which seeks to promote the best interests of the child, 10 8 is highly discretionary and court approval depends upon the particular circumstances of each case.' 0 9 In a
traditional adoption, courts promote the child's best interests by
completely substituting the adoptive family for the natural family.1 0
As a result, intestacy statutes, which define a decedent's intended
heirs by blood relationships, appear at odds with adoption statutes,
which are designed to promote these interests by severing all ties
with blood relatives.11
Over the years lawmakers and judges have acknowledged that
an intestate decedent probably would distribute his estate to those
heirs with whom he had an affective relationship, rather than to all
relatives with whom he had a blood tie, even though the two often
coincide. 12 As a result of this changing viewpoint, courts and legislators now recognize adoptees' inheritance rights from and through
the adoptive family, and sever inheritance rights from and through
the natural family. 1 13 Although state definitions of adoptee inheritance rights are varied and inconsistent, state laws have progressed
and general trends have developed.'14
107 See Presser, supra note 13, at 511; RichardJ. Snyder, Note, Adopted Children: Inheritance Through Intestate Succession, Wills and Similar Instruments, 42 B.U. L. REV. 210, 210
(1962) ("It was said 'Solus Deus Facit Haerdum, Non Homo,' God alone makes the heir,
not man.") (footnote omitted); see also Hockaday v. Lynn, 98 S.W. 585, 587 (Mo. 1906)
(superseded by statute) ("[I]t may be said that laws of descent and distribution, barring
the one incident of a husband and wife's rights by marriage, are universally built on, and
around, the idea of blood kinship. Inheritance flows naturally with the blood.") (citation
omitted).
108
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
109 See Bodenheimer, supra note 63, at 16-19 (discussing the variety of potentially
conflicting interests among the parties involved in an adoption proceeding and the
courts' efforts to balance these interests). See also Howe, supra note 35, at 185.
110 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
111 See Rein, supra note 2, at 713; see infra note 120 and accompanying text.
112 Justice Loevinger of the Minnesota Supreme Court has expressed this acknowledgement as follows:
We have come to realize that it is not the biological act of begetting offspring-which is done even by animals without any family ties-but the
emotional and spiritual experience of living together that creates a family. The family relationship is created far more by love, understanding,
and mutual recognition of reciprocal duties and bonds, than by physical
-

genesis.

Will of Patrick v. Northern City Nat'l Bank of Duluth, 106 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Minn.
1960) (footnote omitted); cf. Rein, supra note 2, at 713.
113
See infra notes 115-62 and accompanying text.
114 For more detailed discussion of the historical development of the law in this
area, see Binavince, supra note 2; Kuhlmann, supra note 2, Presser, supra note 13, at 492514; Rein, supra note 2.
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Inheritance Rights Between the Adoptee and the Adoptive
Family

Early adoption statutes usually vested adoptive parents with the
same rights and obligations toward the adoptee that they would
have if the child were their biological child.' 15 In addition, the statutes usually relieved the natural parents of these rights and duties."16 These early statutes, however, did not specify the effect that
adoption would have on inheritance rights. 117 "To the extent that
express provisions were inserted in the early statutes, they were,
with few exceptions, conciliatory and conservative-designed to
make certain that the time-honored course of intestate succession
among blood relatives would not be disrupted by the innovation."1 1 8 As the court noted in the 1925 case, Dodson v. Ward, 119
"[w]e are confronted with the task of considering the statutes of descent and distribution and determining how far we may read into
20
that statute the provisions of the statute of adoption."J
Most early courts viewed adoption as an abrogation of the common law and strictly construed adoption statutes, thereby limiting
their application.12 1 Thus, unless the statute expressly created inheritance rights from the adoptive parents and severed inheritance
rights from the natural parents, these courts adhered to traditional
succession law based on consanguinity.12 2 As a companion argument, early courts emphasized the contractual aspect of adoption.
They held that the parties involved could determine the inheritance
11I
See In re Darling's Estate, 159 P. 606 (Cal. 1916) (interpreting CAL. CIv. CODE,
§§ 227-29); Binavince, supra note 2, at 159-60.
116
See Binavince, supra note 2, at 160.
117
See Kuhlmann, supra note 2, at 226; Presser, supra note 13, at 469.
118 Kuhlmann, supra note 2, at 225; see also GROSSBERG, supra note 40, at 275.
119 240 P. 991 (N.M. 1925).
120
Id. at 993. The goals of adoption and succession law can conflict with each other.
See Hughes, supra note 24, at 343 ("[T]he objective of intestacy statutes, which is to pass
property in accordance with a decedent's wishes, can be at cross-purposes with the modem objectives of adoption, which hold paramount the successful integration of the
adoptee into the adoptive family."); see also Quissell, supra note 24, at 224 (noting that
"the underlying conflict.., has not changed").
121
Binavince, supra note 2, at 158; Kuhlmann, supra note 2, at 233; Presser, supra
note 13, at 491-94. Today, although some courts still adhere to a strict constructionist
policy, many courts consider these statutes to be remedial and thus construe them liberally. See Rein, supra note 2, at 722.
122
See Hockaday v. Lynn, 98 S.W. 585, 587 (Mo. 1906) (superseded by statute) ("[I]t
may stand assumed as sound law that consanguinity is so fundamental in statutes of
descents and distributions that it may only be ignored by construction when courts are
forced so to do, either by the terms of express statutes or by inexorable implication.");
Dodson v. Ward, 240 P. 991, 993 (N.M. 1925) ("[L]egislation repudiating or eliminating
blood relationship from the descent of property would be so abhorrent to every incident
of our home and family life as to meet with general disapproval. The courts should
depart from this elemental guideship only when forced to do so by an inexorable statutory demand."); Presser, supra note 13, at 492; Rein, supra note 2, at 713.
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rights as part of the contract, however, they could not affect the
rights of those not party to the "adoption contract," such as grand123
parents and other relatives.
Gradually state legislatures inserted express statutory provisions that departed from the traditional principle of consanguinity.124 First, statutes provided for inheritance rights between the
child and the adoptive parents. 125 The philanthropic motives of the
adoptive parents and the affective ties between the parties justified
legislatures' recognition of inheritance rights between the child and
adoptive parents.' 26 Initially these rights were not reciprocal; the
child could inherit from the adoptive parent, but the adoptive parent could not inherit from the child. 12 7 This reluctance to recognize
reciprocal rights resulted from a desire to protect the child from
predatory adoption 128 and from a belief that reciprocal inheritance
t 29
rights wrongly enriched the adoptive parents.
When states did recognize the adopter's right to inherit from
the child, statutes often provided that the adopter could only inherit
that property which the child had obtained from the adoptive family
by gift, bequest, or devise, while other property passed to the natural family. 130 Alternatively, statutes provided that the adopter inherited all property except that which the child had received from
the natural family by gift, bequest or devise.'1' Today, most jurisdictions recognize reciprocal inheritance rights between the child
132
and his adoptive parents without restriction.
In addition, most states now recognize reciprocal inheritance
33
rights between the child and the relatives of the adoptive parents. 1
123 See Binavince, supra note 2, at 160-61; Hallie E. Still-Cafis, Note, Legislative Reform: Redefining the Parent-ChildRelationship in Cases of Adoption, 71 IowA L. REV. 265, 27071 (1985); Eddins v. Williams, 279 N.W. 244, 245 (S.D. 1938). Other courts broadly
interpreted the language of the adoption statutes as establishing inheritance rights between the adoptee and his adoptive parents. These courts focused on provisions indicating that the child was to be treated as the biological child of the adopters. Viewed
together with the provision that relieves the natural parents of all rights and obligations,
these courts believed that inheritance rights were part and parcel of the adoption process. See Binavince, supra note 2, at 159-60.
124
See Kuhlmann, supra note 2, at 226.
125 See id at 224-26.
126 See Binavince, supra note 2, at 161.
127 See id. at 159, 161.
128 See Kuhlmann, supra note 2, at 225.
129
See Binavince, supra note 2, at 159-61.
13o
See Kuhlmann, supra note 2, at 226, 228 n.40, 231; Kiefer, supra note 104, at 40001.
131
See Kiefer, supra note 104, at 400.
132 See 7 PowELL, supra note 15, at 90-85 to 90-86.
133 See Rein, supra note 2, at 720; see also Annotation, Right of Adopted Child to Inherit
From Kindred of Adoptive Parent, 43 A.L.R.2d 1183, 1189-1201 (1955). One author suggests that 25 states have achieved complete substitution of the adoptive family for the
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This is a logical outgrowth of the recognition of the adopter's inheritance rights. The adopted child is likely to receive the same love
and attention from these relatives as a child born to those same parents.13 4 However, some states still expressly restrict this type of inheritance, treating the adoptee as the child of his adoptive parents,
but not as the relative of the adopter's kindred.' 3 5 Other statutes
are ambiguous or fail to address the issue, leaving it open to judicial
interpretation.13 6 Some courts construe unclear statutes liberally to
allow inheritance rights between an adopted child and his adopted
parents' relatives.1 37 Such an approach comports with the modem
goal of adoption to completely substitute the adoptive family for the
natural family. However, other courts have construed such statutes
138
narrowly.
Courts adopting the latter approach often resort to the same
strict construction of the statutes and contractual analysis used
natural family. See Quissell, supra note 24, at 229 n.50. However, another author has
suggested that the "statutes are so rife with gaps and exceptions that this listing is not
totally accurate." Rein, supra note 2, at 720 n.36.
134 See Rein, supra note 2, at 721-22; Still-Caris, supra note 123, at 271.
135 Rein, supra note 2, at 720-21; see, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 448 (1989)
("Mhere shall be no right of inheritance between the person adopted and his issue on
the one hand and predecessors in line of descent and collateral kin of the person or
persons making the adoption on the other hand."). Until recently, the South Dakota
statute was silent on this issue. However, as a result of legislation in 1990, "[a]ny
adopted child has the same right to inherit by intestate succession from any person related to the adoptive parent, in any degree of kindred, as if the adopted child were the
natural child of the adoptive parent." S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 29-1-5.1 (Supp.
1991). Previously the state supreme court held that an adoptee could not inherit from
his adoptive grandfather through his predeceased father. Eddin's v. Williams, 279 N.W.
244 (S.D. 1938). The court used a contractual analysis and held that the adoption contract could bind only the adoptee, the adoptive parents, and the natural parents. The
court affirmed this view in In re Estate of Edwards, 273 N.W.2d 118 (S.D. 1978) (niece of
adoptive mother cannot inherit through the mother of the adoptee). The new statute
apparently overrules Eddins because it states that an adoptee can inheritfrom otherrelatives.
The statute may also overrule In re Edwards because although the statute does not state
that relatives of the adoptive parents can inherit fom the child, a court could infer that the
legislature intended to create reciprocal inheritance rights. In Tennessee, an adoptee
can inherit from and through his adoptive parents. The adoptive parents' lineal and
collateral kindred, however, can only inherit from and through the adoptee that property that the adoptee acquired after his adoption. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-126 (1984).
136
For example, South Dakota's statute is silent on this issue. For a discussion of
this statute, see supra note 135.
137
See Kuhlmann, supra note 2, at 235-36; Rein, supra note 2, at 722. As early as
1919, the court in In re Masterson's Estate noted that, although some courts adhered to
strict statutory construction, "the prevailing tendency of the more modem authorities is
in the direction of a liberal construction." 183 P. 93, 94 (Wash. 1919), citing BatchellerDurkee v. Batcheller, 97 A. 378 (R.I. 1916)).
138
For a discussion of the narrow contractual approach used by South Dakota
courts, see supra note 135. For a discussion of a similar approach used by Utah courts,
see generally R. S. Erickson, Note, Intestate Succession and Adoption in Utah: A Need for
Legislation, 1969 UTAH L. REv. 56 ("Mhe Utah legislature rescued adopted children
from the court by enacting UPC § 2-109" in 1978); Rein, supra note 2, at 722 n.48.
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under the early adoption statutes.' 3 9 Commentators have criticized
this narrow analysis as contravening the traditional goals of adoption and the principle that courts should construe remedial legislation broadly. 140 However, despite the restrictions on inheritance
rights within the adoptive family that still exist in a few states, the
general trend has been toward filly recognizing reciprocal inheritance rights from and through the adoptee and the adoptive
parents.
B.

Inheritance Rights Between the Adoptee and the Natural
Family

The same reverence for blood relationships that made it difficult to recognize inheritance rights within the adoptive family made
it even more difficult for early courts and legislatures to sever inheritance rights within the natural family. Some statutes expressly preserved the adoptee's right to inherit from his natural relatives;' 4 1 in
14 2
fact, only a few states expressly deprived the child of this right.
Where statutes were incomplete or ambiguous, courts again relied
on strict construction of the statutes to permit this right. 143 Therefore, the earliest statutes generally granted additional inheritance
rights to the adoptee from his adoptive family, but did not sever any
144
pre-existing rights from his natural family.
The first changes occurred when courts preserved the child's
right to inherit from his natural parents, but denied the reciprocal
right of the natural parent to inherit from the child. 145 This reSee supra text accompanying notes 121-23.
See Kuhlmann, supra note 2, at 235-36; Rein, supra note 2, at 722. In addition,
Rein criticizes the idea that parents who adopt a child are "foisting" a potential heir on
relatives who did not consent to the adoption. Rein states that "[t]hese arguments ignore the fact that a child's birth always imposes a potential heir on the relatives of his
biological parents, yet no one would suggest that the child should not inherit from his
blood relatives because they had not consented to his conception." Id at 721; see also
Binavince, supra note 2, at 185-86. Furthermore, such criticism ignores the fact that
these same relatives could inherit from the adoptee should the adoptee predecease
them, if reciprocal inheritance rights were recognized. Binavince, supra note 2, at 11516. Finally, "[i]f the relatives have reason to oppose the child's taking in their estate,
they are not without effective remedy; the right of testation affords ample protection."
Id at 185.
141
See Kuhlmann, supra note 2, at 229.
139
140

142
143

Id.

Id. at 237. For cases upholding the adoptee's right to inherit from natural relatives in the absence of statutory language expressly denying this right, see In re
Penfield's Estate, 81 F. Supp. 622 (D.D.C. 1949); In re Tilliski's Estate, 61 N.E.2d 24 (Ill.
1945); In re Sauer, 257 N.W. 28 (Ms. 1934); but see In re Darling, 159 P. 606 (Cal. 1916)
(superseded by statute) (right to inherit from natural parents is severed; however,
adoptee can inherit from natural grandparents because the statute does not address the
relationship between the adoptee and the grandparents).
144
See Kuhlmann, supra note 2, at 225-27, 237-38.
See Binavince, supra note 2, at 164-65; Quissell, supra note 24, at 226.
145
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flected a belief that the child did not consent to the adoption and
should not be deprived of any inheritance rights. 14 6 The natural
parents, on the other hand, did consent to the adoption, in essence
giving up their rights. In addition, as courts and legislatures recognized the adopter's right to inherit from the child, they also began
to prefer the adoptive parents over the natural parents when providing for inheritance from an adopted child, 14 7 thus recognizing the
48
adoptive parents who cared for and supported the child.'
Following similar logic, courts and legislatures initially maintained the child's right to inherit from other natural relatives and
those relatives' right to inherit from the child. 14 9 These relatives,
like the child, did not consent to the adoption and, therefore, the
usual rules of succession law would not be altered. 50 As a result,
these relatives could inherit from the child even though the natural
parents could not. As the trend toward severance continued, however, legislatures terminated the child's right to inherit from these
relatives, as well as the reciprocal right of the natural relatives to
inherit from the child. 15 1
This trend toward severance reflects the traditional complete
substitution of the adoptive family for the natural family.' 52 The
Revised Uniform Adoption Act and the Uniform Probate Code both
reflect this fresh start approach. Each provides for inheritance

In Sledge v. Floyd, 104 So. 163 (Miss. 1925), the court stated that
[w]e do not think the statute intended to deprive children of their rights
to inherit from their natural parents and blood relatives. To do so would
raise grave questions where a child having expectations should be
adopted against its consent or without its power to consent during the
tender years of minority and thus be deprived of benefits.
Id at 165. See also In re Benner, 166 P.2d 257, 258 (Utah 1946) ("His natural parent, by
his consent to his adoption, loses his right to inherit from his natural son. But no one
consents for the innocent and helpless subject of the transfer that he shall lose the right
to inherit from his natural parent....") (quoting Sorenson v. Churchill, 212 N.W. 488,
489 (S.D. 1927)).
147
See Kuhlmann, supra note 2, at 241.
148 See id
149 See Binavince, supra note 2, at 170-71.
150 See In re Benner's Estate, 166 P.2d 257, 258 (Utah 1986); Sorenson v. Churchill,
212 N.W. 488 (S.D. 1927); see also Rein, supra note 2, at 723 n.51. Injurisdictions where
more distant relatives were permitted to inherit from the child, courts developed special
rules regarding the distribution of property. Some courts decreed that the adoptive
parents were the heirs of first choice. When the adoptive parents predeceased the child,
however, the natural relatives inherited according to the usual rules of succession.
Other courts distributed the child's estate between the adoptive family and the natural
family according to the source of the property. See Binavince, supra note 2, at 171.
151 See 7 POWELL, supra note 15, at 90-89.
152 See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
146
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rights through the adoptive family only, except in the case of step153
parent adoptions.
In some states the severance of inheritance rights from the natural family is absolute. Statutes in these states provide that the child
can inherit from and through the adoptive line only. 5 4 Other states
have not followed this trend and have statutes that expressly preserve the child's right to inherit from and through his natural parents. 15 5 In states where statutes are silent on this issue, courts have
156
regularly recognized inheritance rights from natural relatives.
Preserving the child's inheritance rights from his natural family 15 7 when an infant is adopted by strangers contravenes the trend
toward severance, and commentators have criticized these statutes
and cases for hindering the fresh start policy. 158 Commentators
have also criticized the preservation of natural family inheritance
rights as impractical because most states seal adoption records to
protect the confidentiality of the natural parents, making it nearly
impossible for the adoptee and the natural family to locate each
other. 15 9 Finally, preserving inheritance rights can result in dual in153
REV. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 14, 9 U.L.A. 58-59 (1988); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2114, 8 U.L.A. 66-67 (1983). The Uniform Probate Code was revised in 1990. The applicable provision in the pre-1990 version was § 2-109. Although both the RUAA and UPC
recognize an exception for stepparent adoptions, they do not address these exceptions
in the same way. See infra text accompanying notes 240-53.
154
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 700.110 (West 1980), 710.60 (West Supp.
1991); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 11.04.085 (West 1987), 26.33.260 (1986); other states
have stepparent exceptions which preserve inheritance rights from the natural parent
married to the adopting stepparent. In essence, these are not "exceptions" at all because a court is unlikely to deny inheritance rights between a child and a custodial parent. For a list of these statutes, see infra note 242.
155

20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

§ 2108 (Supp. 1990) (preserving inheritance rights from

natural kin, other than the natural parent, where that kin maintained a family relationship with the adoptee); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-7-16, 15-7-17 (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 25-6-16, 25-6-17 (1984) (as interpreted in Sorenson v. Churchill, 212 N.W. 488
(S.D. 1927)); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 40 (West Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15
§ 448 (1989); Wyo. STAT. § 2-4-107 (1980).
156 See supra note 143 and accompanying text; see also Binavince, supra note 2, at 165
("the prevailing view still is to recognize this right"); Kuhlmann, supra note 2, at 237;
Rein, supra note 2, at 723.
157
Although statutes and cases preserve the child's right to inherit from the natural
family, this right usually is not reciprocal. In states where natural parents are entitled to
inherit from the child, this inheritance is usually limited to property acquired from the
natural parents. See Binavince, supra note 2, at 165. For a discussion of these "source
statutes" as originally applied to adoptive parents, see supra text accompanying notes
130-31.
158 See Binavince, supra note 2, at 165 ("[The existence of this right is inconsistent
with the child's complete assimilation to the adoptive family."); Kuhlmann, supra note 2,
at 248-49; see also Rein, supra note 2, at 723-25 (suggesting that contact through intestacy proceedings could cause premature disclosure of the child's adoption and result in
the child feeling divided loyalties).
159 See Rein, supra note 2, at 724; see also In re Estates of Donnelly, 502 P.2d 1163,
1167 (Wash. 1972) (noting that due to the changed birth certificates, grandparents
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heritance for adopted children because they will inherit not only
from adoptive but also natural families.1 60 Natural children of the
adoptive parents do not have this advantage and may resent the
16 1
adoptee's increased inheritance.
Despite these general trends toward recognizing inheritance
rights from and through the adoptive family, and toward severing all
ties between the child and the natural family, nonuniformity and inconsistency persist. Another issue that states approach differently is
stepparent and relative adoptions. Many states make an exception
for stepparent adoptions and preserve inheritance rights between
16 2
the child and the natural family.
III
EXCEPTIONS

FOR STEPPARENT AND OTHER RELATIVE

ADOPTIONS

In-family adoptions, also called relative adoptions, typically
occur as follows: (1) An orphaned child is adopted by a blood relative, usually a grandparent; (2) a young unwed mother lets her
parents adopt and raise her illegitimate child; (3) one biological
parent dies while still married to the other, and the surviving biological parent eventually marries a new spouse who adopts the
child; or (4) following divorce of the biological parents the custodial parent remarries and the stepparent adopts the child with the
consent of, or after the death of, the noncustodial parent.' 63
64
More than half of the adoptions each year are relative adoptions,
and an overwhelming percentage of these adoptions are stepparent
"have no assurance that they will know the new name or residence of the adopted child"
and that in the typical situation, an estate administrator "will be unable to locate-much
less to identify-the post-adoption grandchild"). However, the practice of confidentiality has been criticized and is less strict than it once was. Such changes indicate relaxation, and perhaps eventual reversal of the fresh start policy. See supra notes 92-101 and
accompanying text.
160
Dual inheritance results when an adoptee inherits from both adoptive and natural families or when the adoptee is related to the same decedent in both adoptive and
natural relationships. See infra text accompanying notes 211-28.
161 See Rein, supra note 2, at 726; Still-Caris, supra note 123, at 280. Commentators
have also noted the sometimes bizarre results of dual inheritance. See, e.g., Binavince,
supra note 2, at 165-69; Kuhlmann, supra note 2, at 238-39; and Rein, supra note 2, at
724-27 (all criticizing courts that have permitted a twice-adopted child to inherit from
both sets of adoptive parents).
162 See generally Annotation, Right ofAdopted Child to Inherit From Intestate NaturalGrandparent, 60 A.L.R.3d 631, 642 (1974) (discussing statutes that have stepparent
exceptions).
163 Rein, supra note 2, at 728.
164 In 1975, a total of 104,000 adoptions were completed in the 42 jurisdictions
reporting statistics. WILIAM MEEZAN, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., PUB.
No. (OHDS) 80-30288, ADOPTION SERVICES IN THE STATES 4 (1980). Jurisdictions reported the relationship between the petitioner and child for 101,000 of the adoptions.
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adoptions.1 65 Because relative adoptions involve significantly different factual circumstances, and thus implicate different policy considerations than those involved in traditional adoptions, 16 6 it is not
surprising that the practices that further the best interests of the
child also differ.
States have recognized the different considerations involved in
stepparent adoptions by enacting exceptions to the traditional
adoption policy of severing inheritance rights from the natural parents. These "exceptions" preserve the rights of the stepparent
adoptee to inherit from his natural parents.
Perhaps the best way to demonstrate the effect of a stepparent
exception is by examining a typical situation to which an exception
would apply. In Estates of Donnelly, 167 the administratrix petitioned
the Washington court to determine heirship to her father's estate
and to declare that his granddaughter, the administratrix' niece,
could not inherit from his estate. 16 8 The decedent, John J. Donnelly, and his wife, Lily, had two children, a daughter, Kathleen M.,
and a son, John J., Jr. John J., Jr. had one child, a daughter, Jean
Louise Donnelly, born October 28, 1945. JohnJ.,Jr. died less than
one year after Jean's birth on July 9, 1946. Jean's mother, Faith
Louise Donnelly, married Richard Roger Hansen approximaiely two
years later. Shortly after this marriage, Richard adopted Jean Louise with consent of her natural mother. Jean Louise lived with her
mother and adoptive father and used the name Hansen until her
169
marriage.
Lily Donnelly died in 1964, leaving all of her property to her
husband. John J. Donnelly, Sr., died on September 15, 1970. He
left a will dated October 16, 1932, in which he devised all of his
property to his wife. He made no provisions for the distribution of
his property in the event that his wife predeceased him. His daughter, Kathleen, was named administratrix.1 70 The trial court decided
that Jean Louise could inherit from her natural grandfather through
63% (64,000) of the adoptions were relative adoptions. Of these, 85y (57,000) of the
adoptions were stepparent adoptions. Id. 1975 was the last year in which federal adoption statistics were compiled. ADOPTION FAcTmOOK, supra note 2, at 59-60. The National
Committee For Adoption has tabulated statistics for 1982 and 1986. Idt Adoptions by
related petitioners constituted 63% of all adoptions in 1975; 64% in 1982; and 51% in
1986. Id. at 99.
165 See supra note 164.
166 See infra text accompanying notes 194-99; see also Rein, supra note 2, at 728 (noting different context of relative adoptions.); Hughes, supra note 24, at 340 (noting that
total severance in an in-family adoption situation may be "imprudent.").
167 502 P.2d 1163 (Wash. 1973).
168 Id. at 1164.
169

Id.

170

Id.
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her deceased natural father, JohnJ., Jr.17 1 The daughter, Kathleen,
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed, 72 and subsequently to the Washington Supreme Court, which reversed the deci17 3
sion of the trial court.
The court first concluded that both the daughter and the granddaughter were "issue" of the grandfather and, under normal circumstances, would share the estate as dictated by the descent and
distribution statutes. 174 The court then proceeded to determine
whether Jean Louise was divested of her statutory inheritance right
by virtue of another Washington statute which provided that "[a]
lawfully adopted child shall not be considered an 'heir' of his natural
parents's for purposes of this title."' 1 5 The court noted that previously it had held that the legislative intent was clear, and an adopted
child could not inherit a share of the natural parent's estate by intestate succession.' 7 6 Thus, the question became whether the statute
also precluded an adoptee from representing the natural parent and
177
thereby inheriting from the natural grandparent.
In deciding the issue the court noted that Washington's adoption statute divested the natural parent "of all legal rights and obligations in respect to the child" and provided that the child "shall be
...
the child, legal heir, and lawful issue of his or her adopter or
adopters, entitled to all rights and privileges, including the right of
inheritance.., and subject to all the obligations of a child... begotten in lawful wedlock."' 7 8 Reading the probate and domestic relations statute together, the court found that the legislative purpose
was clear and that the issue "should... be decided in the context of
the broad legislative objective of giving the adopted child a 'fresh
start' by trusting him as the natural child of the adoptive parent, and
severing all ties with the past."' 17 9 The court concluded that "the
legislature intended to remove an adopted child from his natural
bloodline for purposes of intestate succession."' i8 0
The court did not consider whether Jean Louise and her grandparents had maintained contact. However, it did note that grandparents are not entitled to notice of adoption proceedings and that
adoption records are confidential; therefore, natural grandparents
171
172
173

Id.
Id.

174

Id- at 1168.
Id. at 1165.

175

Id.

176

Id. (citing In re Estate of Wiltermood, 472 P.2d 536 (Wash. 1970)).
Id. at 1165.

177
178
179

Id.

180

Id.

Id. at 1166.
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cannot ensure that they will maintain contact with the adoptee.18s

In fact, according to the court, in a typical "out of family" adoption
situation, the administrator of a deceased natural grandparent's estate often will be unable to locate-much less identify-the post8
adoption grandchild.'

2

In most states recognizing stepparent exceptions, Jean Louise
Iverson would have inherited from her grandfather in Estates of Don-

nelly. However, had Jean Louise been adopted after the divorce of
her natural parents instead of after the death of her natural father,
the result would have differed in several states. This difference reflects the states' varied views on the policies involved in stepparent

adoptions.
83
Most states limit these exceptions to stepparent adoptions.'
But since the same rationales apply to all relative adoptions, states
should extend these stepparent exceptions to encompass a broad
range of relative adoptions. Following is a review of the arguments
for and against these exceptions.
A.

Policy Considerations

In the traditional stranger-infant adoption, policy considera84
tions call for complete severance of ties to the natural family.'
Severance prevents natural relatives from interfering with the adoptive family and makes it socially and psychologically easier for the
child to bond with his new family.' 8 5 Severance also protects the
confidentiality of the natural parents because sealed adoption
records make it virtually impossible for the child and his natural
family to locate each other.' 8 6 Moreover, complete severance of
these inheritance rights helps to insure that the child's adoption will
not be prematurely revealed, which could cause psychological
87
damage.'
Succession law has not only complemented and furthered the
modem goals of adoption law,' 8 8 but it has also furthered its own
policies. A parent who voluntarily relinquishes a child for adoption
and maintains no future contact with that child, probably would not
intend for the adoptee to inherit from him should he die intes181

Id. at 1167.

Id.
See infra notes 229-92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 53-56.
See supra notes 55-56.
See Rein, supra note 2, at 729; see also supra note 58 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of recent changes to confidentiality laws, see supra note 92-101 and accompanying text.
187
See Rein, supra note 2, at 724.
188 See 7 POWELL, supra note 15, at 90-83 to 90-85; Hughes, supra note 24, at 345-49.
182
183
184
185
186
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tate. 18 9 Similarly, other natural relatives probably would not intend
that the child share in their intestate estates.' 90 Therefore, severance prevents unfair surprise and frustration of the decedent's probable intentions. Severance also reduces the costs of administering
estates because natural relatives will not have to search for an
adopted heir whose name and whereabouts are unknown.' 9 '
Complete severance also decreases the dual inheritance problem. 19 2 Without complete severance, the adoptee would inherit
from two families, a result that seems unfair to nonadopted children, whose shares might be decreased, as well as to the natural
relative, who may have died intestate without even knowing of the
child's existence or anticipating that the child would share in the
estate.19 3 These reasons support the fresh start policy and the practice of complete severance of ties in traditional adoptions.
However, these reasons do not apply to relative adoptions in
general, or to stepparent adoptions in particular.' 9 4 Typically, the
child's adoption is known to all natural family members, and the
need to preserve confidentiality does not exist.' 9 5 In addition, the
adoptee normally maintains contact with his natural relatives as a
189 Anne W. French, Note, When Blood Isn't Thicker Than Water: The InheritanceRights
of Adopted-out Children in New York, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 1007, 1042 (1988)
It is questionable, however, whether a divorced parent who surrenders
his or her child for adoption, and then proceeds to carry on a new life,
perhaps remarrying and possibly having other children, would wish this
adopted-out child to share in his or her estate, depriving the new family
of property rights.
190 Id. (criticizing New York law for allowing adoptee to inherit from such relatives).
Indeed, these relatives may not even know of the child's existence.
191 See Hughes, supra note 24, at 343 ("Tracing the adopted child as an heir to such
an estate is extremely difficult if not impossible."); Quissell, supra note 24, at 230; StillCanfs, supra note 123, at 275.
192 See Rein, supra note 2, at 725-26.
193 French, supra note 189, at 1042; Hughes, supra note 24, at 338-39. For a fuller
discussion of the dual inheritance problem, see infra notes 211-28 and accompanying
text.
194 See Rein, supra note 2, at 728, 730; Hughes, supra note 24, at 340; Quissel, supra
note 24, at 230-31; Still-Caris, supra note 123, at 275-76.
195 See Rein, supra note 2, at 730; Hughes, supra note 24, at 340-42; Quissell, supra
note 24, at 230-31; Still-Caris, supra note 123, at 275-76. When explaining the 1975
technical amendments to the UPC which preserved inheritance rights from the natural
family, Professor Wellman noted the different circumstances involved in stepparent
adoptions. Professor Wellman stated:
[w]e think that it's desirable to have adoptions terminate relations to natural parents when the adopted person is an orphan and disconnected
from all natural parents. We think that when there is in the picture as the
spouse of the new adopting parent one of the child's own natural parents,
everybody is aware of the child's source-the relatives are aware, and
there is no need statutorily now-awkwardly now, we suggest, to try to
come in and sever that old relationship.
Cathy J. Jones, Stepparent Adoption and Inheritance: A Suggested Revision of Uniform Probate
Code Section 2-109, 8 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 53, 64 (1986) (quoting National Conference of
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matter of course, eliminating the need to prevent interference with
the adoptive family. 19 6 Finally, in most stepparent adoptions, the
child is older and has memories of his natural family. 19 7 Severing
these ties may cause psychological damage and actually inhibit the
child's bonding with his adoptive family.' 9 8 Preserving ties to the
natural family gives a child a sense of permanence and continuity,
19 9
which facilitates the child's assimilation into his new family.
Thus, the adoption policy considerations that call for a fresh start
and complete severance are inoperative in cases of relative
adoptions.
Complete severance in cases of relative adoptions does not further the goals of succession law. Because the child and the natural
family remain in contact, a deceased natural parent or other relative
would probably have expected and desired that the child share in
the intestate estate. 20 0 Continued contact also makes it easy for
family members to locate one another; therefore, costs of estate administration are not significantly increased. Since the only reason
for succession law to depart from the traditional principle of consanguinity was to further the fresh start policy, some commentators
argue that no deviations should be made where that policy is not
20
implicated. '
Others argue that the continuation of affective ties and contact
between the child and his natural family does not necessarily mean
that the preservation of inheritance rights is appropriate. While acknowledging that the considerations underlying the fresh start policy are not fully implicated in stepparent adoptions, these
commentators argue that more general adoption policy considerations are still relevant and justify severance of natural family inheritance rights. 20 2 For example, even though contact may continue
between the child and his natural family, this contact may be disruptive to the new family unit. 20 3 Severing all legal obligations, thereCommissioners on Uniform State Laws, Proceedings on the Uniform Probate Code 6-7 (Tent.
Draft Aug.)).
196 See Rein, supra note 2, at 730; French, supra note 189, at 1039; Hughes, supra note
24, at 340-42; Quissell, supra note 24, at 230-31; Still-Caris, supra note 123, at 275-76.
197 See supra notes 67, 70-71 and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
199
See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
200
See Rein, supra note 2, at 730 ("In cases in which natural associations and emotional bonds remain, continuing ties of inheritance may make sense."); cf French, supra
note 189, at 1041-42 (suggesting that no reason exists to sever inheritance rights in
stepparent adoptions that occur after the death of a natural parent).
201
See Still-Caris, supra note 123, at 274-79.
202
See Hughes, supra note 24, at 341-44.
203
See id at 342; but see Visher & Visher, supra note 73, at 37 ("Even though maintaining contact with a biological parent may be awkward for the adults involved, it is
generally to the psychological advantage of the child."); Nathan, supra note 63, at 666
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fore, is in the best interests of the child because it discourages
20 4
potentially intrusive contact by the natural family.
In the case of a stepparent adoption that occurs with the consent of a relinquishing natural parent, commentators argue that
such consent indicates that the relinquishing parent no longer considers the child as his own.2 0 5 However, maintaining inheritance
20 6
rights prevents a complete termination of rights and obligations.
"Hence, to give full effect to the implications of a legal adoption,
adoptee inheritance rights from the relinquishing natural bloodline
' '20 7
must be terminated.
Some commentators also suggest that severance in relative
adoptions does further the goals of succession law. They challenge
the assumption that the child and the natural family will, in fact,
maintain contact with each other.2 08 In many cases, either the adoptive or natural family may move away and as a result, they will lose
contact with each other.20 9 In cases where no contact continues between the child and the natural family, severance of inheritance
rights not only facilitates quick and efficient estate administration,
eliminating the need to search for heirs, but also promotes certainty
10
of titles.2
Finally, complete severance eliminates the possibility of dual inheritance. 2 1 ' As one commentator noted,
[d]ual inheritance occurs when inheritance through the natural
bloodline is not severed, and the adopted child inherits from both
adopted and natural family lines. Usually the question of dual inheritance arises from one or two fact patterns. The first is where a
relative, such as a grandparent, adopts the child of deceased parents, then the relative dies intestate, and the child inherits in the
dual capacity of adopted child and natural grandchild [thereby receiving a double share]. The second is where an adopted child is
not expressly denied the right to inherit from both natural and
(suggesting that contact may be disruptive for the parents, but beneficial for the child,
and that disruptive contact "does not always endanger the integrity of the adoptive
family").
204
See Hughes, supra note 24, at 342.
205
206

See id at 343.
See idl at 342.

207
Idl at 342-43; see also Rein, supra note 2, at 730 ("The preservation of the child's
relationship with a parent who has voluntarily relinquished the child for adoption or
abandoned him in some manner seems wrong.").
208
See French, supra note 189, at 1042; Hughes, supra note 24, at 343.
209
See Hughes, supra note 24, at 343. This loss of contact can occur when the adoption takes place after the death or divorce of the natural parents.
210

See id. at 343.

211

See Rein, supra note 2, at 725-26.
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adopted parents by statute [and thereby inherits from three family
2 12
lines].
Even those in favor of maintaining inheritance rights in relative
adoptions recommend that legislatures enact provisions to eliminate
2 13
dual inheritance.
The problem of dual inheritance is best illustrated by the following example, which distinguishes between the "third family line"
and "double share" types of dual inheritance and the differences
between statutes that sever all inheritance rights to the natural fam2 14
ily and those that make an exception for relative adoptions.
Imagine that both parents of a child, Sam, die in an accident
and Sam is adopted by his paternal aunt and her husband. In a state
that follows the modem trend and severs all inheritance rights from
the natural family, Sam will still inherit from his natural paternal
line, only now he will inherit as the child of the paternal aunt, not as
the child of his natural father. 2 15 However, Sam will not inherit
from his natural maternal line, despite the affective ties and contact
2 16
that will probably continue with his natural maternal relatives.
Instead, he will inherit through his paternal aunt's husband, or the
adoptive paternal line. 2 17 No dual inheritance occurs because Sam
only inherits from two family lines.
In a state that maintains inheritance rights from the natural
family, the result is much different. Sam will now inherit from his
natural maternal and paternal lines, as well as through his adoptive
2 18
paternal line. Therefore, Sam will inherit from three family lines.
The problem is more complicated if Sam is adopted by his paternal grandparents and they later die intestate. Unless the legisla212
QuisseIl, supra note 24, at 231 (footnotes omitted); see also Binavince, supra note
2, at 166-72; Annotation, supra note 162, at 643-46.
213
See Rein, supra note 2, at 730; Still-Caris, supra note 123, at 280 ("Since adoption
attempts to place an adoptee in the position of a birth child, not in a more desirable or
less desirable position, the adoptee should not receive two shares.").
214
The "third family line" type of dual inheritance usually occurs in stranger adoptions in states which still adhere to the consanguinity theory and have not yet progressed
toward complete severance of all ties to the natural family. However, as this example
makes clear, this type of dual inheritance also occurs in relative adoptions. For a similar
example in which grandparents adopt their grandchild, see Rein, supra note 2, at 728-29.
215
See Rein, supra note 2, at 729.
216 See id.; see also In re Estate of Holt, 622 P.2d 1032 (N.M. 1981) (child adopted by
stepfather after noncustodial father's death denied right to inherit from natural paternal
grandmother); In re Estates of Donnelly, 502 P.2d 1163 (Wash. 1972) (child adopted by
stepfather denied right to inherit from natural paternal grandfather); In re Estate of

Topel, 145 N.W.2d 162 (Wis. 1966) (child adopted by stepfather after noncustodial father's death denied right to inherit from natural paternal grandfather). The Topel decision was later overruled by statute. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 851.51(2)(b) (West 1991). For
an analysis of the Holt decision, see Quissell, supra note 24.
217
See Rein, supra note 2, at 729.
218 See id. at 728-30; Hughes, supra note 24, at 343; Quissell, supra note 24, at 231.
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ture21 9 or the court 220 restricts dual inheritance, Sam will inherit
from his grandparents as an adopted child and as a grandchild representing his deceased father. 2 21 Allowing Sam to inherit the
double share seems unfair to any other natural heirs, whose intestate share will be decreased. This type of dual inheritance will seem
especially unequitable to Sam's adoptive siblings, who will inherit
only one share from their parents as compared to Sam's two shares.
Stepparent exceptions that allow an adopted child to inherit
from his natural family always result in dual inheritance. The
adoptee will inherit from three family lines. But this type of dual
inheritance is not objectionable. Because of the affective ties and
continued contact between the child and the natural relatives after a
stepparent adoption, the probable intentions of the natural relatives
would be to allow the child to share in the intestate estate. 222 However, dual inheritance is objectionable when an adoptee is related to
the decedent in both an adoptive and natural relationship. 223 While
the decedent would probably intend for the adoptee with whom he
has maintained an affective relationship to share in the estate, it is
unlikely that the decedent would intend for the adoptee to receive
two shares of the estate. This "double share" type of dual inheritance is also unfair to other heirs because it decreases their shares in
2 24
the estate.
States react in various ways to "double share" dual inheritance;
some allow the adoptee to inherit from the same decedent in two
capacities; 22 5 others restrict the adoptee to the larger of the two pos219
See Rein, supra note 2, at 728-30; Hughes, supra note 24, at 343; Quissell, supra
note 24, at 231. See infra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
220 See Billings v. Head, 11 N.E. 177, 177 (Ind. 1916) ("[I]t was not the legislative
purpose that an adopted grandchild should ever inherit more of its adopting parent's
estate than would one of his natural children, and where, as here, the heir occupies a
dual capacity, it cannot inherit both as grandchild and adopted child."); Morgan v. Reed,
62 A. 253, 256 (Pa. 1905) ("The act.., intended to put the adopted child on the same
footing as actual children, if such there should be, but not on any more favorable
footing.").
221
See Rein, supra note 2, at 728-30; Hughes, supra note 24, at 343; Quissell, supra
note 24, at 231. See also In re Bartram's Estate, 198 P. 192 (Kan. 1921); In re Benner's
Estate, 166 P. 2d 257 (Utah 1946).
222
See Rein, supra note 2, at 731; Hughes, supra note 24, at 343; Quissell, supra note
24, at 232. However, dual inheritance resulting from a state's failure to sever inheritance rights from the natural relatives in the case of a traditional adoption is objectionable. In a traditional adoption, no affective ties exist between the natural relatives and
the adoptee. Preserving inheritance rights would frustrate the probable intentions of
the deceased natural relative.
223
See supra text accompanying note 222.
224
In addition, while it seems likely that the decedent would want the adoptee to
share in the estate, it seems unlikely that the decedent would want the adoptee to inherit
in dual capacities.
225
See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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sible shares; 22 6 and some specify whether the adoptee inherits in the
natural or adoptive relationship. 22 7 These variations stem from a
difference in opinion as to whether dual inheritance is a problem.
"The underlying issue is whether recognition of an adoptee's inheritance from both natural and adopted bloodlines affords the adopted
2 28
child preferential treatment."
B.

Various Approaches Toward Exceptions in Cases of
Stepparent and Other Relative Adoptions

When drafting legislation on the inheritance rights of adopted
children, legislatures must reach a result that furthers the goals of
both adoption and succession law. 22 9 Unfortunately, some legisla-

tures will view these stepparent and other relative adoptions exceptions as a residual, outdated adherence to consanguinity. 23 0 Under
this view, these exceptions frustrate the goals of adoption by
preventing the adoptee from getting a fresh start in his new family. 2 3 ' They also frustrate the goals of succession law by creating

2 32
uncertainty of titles and hindering estate administration.
A better view of these exceptions sees them as necessary to further the goals of a different type of adoption. 23 3 That is, states enacting such exceptions should realize that relative and stepparent
adoptions involve different factual circumstances and policy considerations, which may require the preservation of inheritance rights to

further the goals of adoption law.23 4 In addition, these exceptions

further the goals of succession law by preventing frustration of the
decedent's probable intentions where actual contact and affective
23 5
ties continue between the adoptee and the natural family.

A legislature that desires to create an exception for stepparent
and other relative adoptions must decide how to approach such ex226

HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-114 (1988); IND. CODE ANN.

§§ 29-1-2-8, 29-1-2-9

(Bums 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-03.1 (Supp. 1991). This is also the position
of the Uniform Probate Code. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-113, 8 U.L.A. 76 (Supp. 1991).
227 New York specifies that the adoptee inherits the share based on the natural rela-

tionship, unless the decedent is also the adopter, in which case the adoptee inherits
pursuant to the adoptive relationship. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 117(e) (McKinney 1988).
In Illinois and Rhode Island, the adoptee inherits pursuant to the adoptive relationship
only: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 2-4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS

§ 15-7-16(b) (1988).
228 Quissell, supra note 24, at 232.
229 See supra text accompanying notes 103-62.
230 Some commentators also view the exceptions in this way. See, e.g., Hughes, supra
note 24, at 350-51.
231 Id.
232
233
234
235

Id.

See supra text accompanying notes 194-99.
See supra text accompanying notes 194-99.

See supra text accompanying notes 200-01.
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ceptions. The approach selected should be one which best implements the goals of both adoption and succession law. The
remainder of this Part will describe and evaluate the various approaches to the stepparent exception to determine the extent to
which each furthers the goals of adoption and succession law.
Several approaches to stepparent and other relative adoptions
exist, illustrating the lack of uniformity that pervades this area of
law. The majority of states that recognize stepparent exceptions follow either the Revised Uniform Adoption Act (RUAA) approach or
the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) approach. 23 6 Both the RUAA and
the UPC follow the trend towards complete substitution of the
adoptive family for the natural family in traditional adoptions, but
each makes an exception in stepparent adoptions. 23 7 A few states
have responded to stepparent adoptions with unusual solutions,
23 8
some of which also cover other relative adoptions.
Stepparent adoptions occur in three typical fact patterns.
These are:
(1) a natural parent dies while the parents are married to each
other, the surviving natural parent remarries, and the new spouse
adopts the child; (2) the natural parents are divorced, the natural
parent with custody of the child remarries, the other natural parent dies, and then the stepparent adopts the child... (3) the natural parents are divorced, the parent with custody of the child
remarries, the stepparent with the consent of the other [noncustodial] natural parent adopts the child, and then the other [non23 9
custodial] natural parent dies.
State approaches vary regarding which of the preceding fact situations warrant an exception.
1. The Revised Uniform Adoption Act and the Uniform Probate Code
The RUAA provides that a final decree of adoption relieves the
natural parents of all rights and obligations toward the adoptee and
"terminate[s] all legal relationships between the adopted individual
and his [natural] relatives, including his natural parents, so that the
adopted individual thereafter is a stranger to his former relatives for
all purposes including inheritance. ' 240 In addition, the decree cre236 REV. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 14,9 (Part I) U.L.A. 58-59 (1988); UNIF. PROB. CODE
§ 2-114, 8 U.L.A. 76-77 (Supp. 1991). The applicable provision in the pre-1990 UPC
cases was § 2-109.
237
See infra text accompanying notes 240-53.
238
See infra text accompanying notes 254-92.
239 Quissell, supra note 24, at 233. Some stepparent exceptions, like the UPC's, preserve inheritance rights in the third fact pattern even though the other natural parent
has not died. See infra text accompanying notes 245-52.
240
REV. UNIF. ADOPTION Acr § 14(a)(1), 9 U.L.A. 58 (1988).
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ates the relationship between the adoptee and the adoptive family
"as if the adopted individual were a legitimate blood descendant of
'24 1
the [adoptive parents] for all purposes including inheritance."
These provisions effectively recognize the complete substitution of
the adoptive family for the natural family.
However, the RUAA provides an exception to the complete severance of inheritance rights from the natural parents. First, the
RUAA provides that a stepparent adoption has no effect on the relationship between the child and the natural parent married to the
adopting stepparent. 24 2 Second, the RUAA states that "if a parent
of a child dies without the relationship of parent and child having
been previously terminated and a spouse of the living parent thereafter adopts the child, the child's right of inheritance from or
through the deceased parent is unaffected by the adoption." 243
244
This second provision applies in fact patterns one and two above.
Id. § 14(a)(2).
Id. § 14(a)(1). Even without such a provision, a court probably would not deny
the child's right to inherit from the custodial natural parent. The relationship between
the child and the custodial natural parent would not be severed by the adoption of the
child by the stepparent. See Rein, supra note 2, at 729 n.73. In essence, this provision is
not a true "exception" to the severance of inheritance rights. Nevertheless, it is the
most common response that states make to stepparent adoptions. In the following
states it is the only "exception" in cases of stepparent adoptions: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
99 8-117(B), 14-2109(1) (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-9-215(a)(1) (1991); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 12, § 508(1) (1987), tit. 13, § 920(c) (1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-312(a)
(1989); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 560:2-109(1) (1988); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 214.6 (West
Supp. 1991); MD. EsT. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. §§ 1-207(a) (1991); MD. FAMILY LAW CODE
ANN. § 5-308(b)(3) (1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 453.090(1) (Vernon 1986), 474.060(l)
(West Supp. 1991); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 30-2309(1) (1989), 43-110 (1988), 43-111
(1988); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.160 (Michie 1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170B:20(II) (1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-109(A) (Michie 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 2917(e) (1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.16(B) (West Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-7-1770, 62-2-109(1) (Law. Co-op Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-109(1)(a)
(1978); W. VA. CODE § 48-4-11 (1986).
243
REv. UNIF. ADOPUON AcT § 14(b), 9 U.L.A. 59 (1988). Several states statutes
reach a similar result. Some of these states have adopted or generally follow the RUAA.
Other states have adopted or follow the UPC. Nevertheless, on this issue, the result
reached in the following states is the same as that reached under the RUAA: ALAsKA
STAT. § 25.23.130(b) (1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-19(b) (Michie 1991); IowA CODE
ANN. § 633.223(3) (West Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 259.29(1)(a) (West 1982),
524.2-109(1) (West Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-15-14(2) (1991), 30.1-04-09
(2-109) (Supp. 1989); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.15(B) (1989); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 48.92 (West 1987), 851.51(2)(b) (West 1991).
244
See supra text accompanying note 239. Idaho has modified the RUAA provision
by preserving inheritance rights from and through the deceased natural parent only if
that parent died while still married to the other natural parent. IDAHO CODE § 15-2-109(a)
(1979). Other states preserve inheritance rights only if the stepparent married the natural parent after the death of the other natural parent. That is, the natural parents do not
have to be married at the time of death in order for the child to maintain inheritance
rights from the deceased natural parent. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-64a(8) (West Supp.
1989); FLA. STAT ANN. §§ 63.172(2) (West 1985 & West Supp. 1991), 732.108 (West
241

242
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The RUAA does not extend the exception to other relative adoptions, nor does it include a provision restricting dual inheritance.
The UPC also recognizes the complete substitution of the
adoptive family for the natural family by providing that "an adopted
person is the child of an adopting parent and not of the natural parents. ' 24 5 The UPC stepparent exception provides that the "adoption of a child by the spouse of either natural parent has no effect on
(i) the relationship between the child and that natural parent or (ii)
the right of the child or a descendent of the child to inherit from or
through the other natural parent. ' 24 6 Thus, the UPC preserves inheritance rights from and through both natural parents when the

stepparent adoption occurs after divorce, as well as after deaththat is, in all three of the fact patterns above. The UPC does not
extend the exception to other relative adoptions. 24 7 However, the

UPC does restrict dual inheritance by providing that "[a] person
who is related to the decedent through 2 lines of relationship is enti-

tled to only a single share based on the relationship which would
entitle him to the larger share." 248
Supp. 1990); MAss. GEN. L. ch. 210, § 210.7 (1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.175(2)(b)
(1990).
245
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-109, 8 U.L.A. 66 (1983). The applicable provision in the
pre-1990 version of the Uniform Probate Code was section 2-109.
246 Id. At one time the applicable UPC provision merely stated that the "adoption of
a child by the spouse of a natural parent has no effect on the relationship between the
child and that parent." In 1975, several technical amendments were made and the word
"that" changed to "either." See Jones, supra note 195, at 64. As a result of this technical
change, the adoptee's inheritance rights from both natural parents remain intact in cases
of stepparent adoptions. The current version of the UPC, adopted in 1990, reaches the
same result. The adoptee continues to inherit from both the natural parents as well as
the stepparent. However, the 1990 UPC does establish a different rule regarding the
noncustodial natural parent. The "noncustodial natural parent and that noncustodial
natural parent's family do not have a right to inherit from or through the adopted individual." UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-114 Cmt. (1990). Several states follow the UPC by preserving the adoptee's inheritance rights from both natural parents after a stepparent
adoption. See ALA.CODE §§ 26-IOA-29 (West Supp. 1991), 43-8-48(1) (1991); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 2-4(a) (West Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2109(1) (West 1981 & West Supp. 1990); MONT.CODE ANN. §§ 40-8-125 (1991), 72-2213(1) (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1(1) (1991).
247
ProfessorJones suggests that the rationale for preserving inheritance rights from
the natural parents in stepparent adoptions-that no hold for secrecy exists since the
child's adopted status is well known-could easily extend to other relative and even nonrelative adoptions. Jones, supra note 195, at 66 n.56.
248
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-114, 8 U.L.A. 72 (1983). This provision is attributed in
part to the change in § 2-109(I)'s wording from "that" to "either," discussed supra at
note 246. See also Jones, supra note 195, at 64-65 n.50 (noting that prior to 1975, a
provision restricting dual inheritance was not needed because the child's inheritance
rights from or through a noncustodial natural parent were terminated upon adoption.
The 1975 change which serves these inheritance rights made a provision restricting dual
inheritance necessary); Rein, supra note 2, at 730 n.77 (pointing out that, in a UPC state,
the only case that might produce dual inheritance is that in which the adopting steppar-
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The RUAA exception is too narrow to further the goals of
adoption for two reasons: (1) it fails to recognize that natural relatives, including the natural parent, may maintain contact after a divorce as well as after the death of a natural parent 24 9 and (2) it does
not extend to other relative adoptions. 25 0 Thus, the RUAA approach furthers the goals of adoption only in a limited number of
situations.
The UPC exception is broader than the RUAA's because it preserves inheritance rights from natural relatives in stepparent adoptions that occur after a divorce, as well as after the death on a
natural parent. 25 1 However, the UPC, like the RUAA, fails to preserve inheritance rights in other relative adoptions, thereby frustrating the goals of adoption in such situations.
Neither approach clearly furthers the goals of succession law in
a majority of cases. Both the RUAA and the UPC assume that contact will continue in all cases of stepparent adoptions occurring after
the death of a natural parent. 252 Such an "all or nothing" approach
is as likely to frustrate as it is to further the goals of succession law.
The UPC makes a broader assumption that contact will continue in
all stepparent adoptions occurring after the divorce of the natural
parents. 2 53 This merely expands the potentially troublesome categories because, while the UPC preserves inheritance rights in more
cases where affective ties might continue, it also preserves these
rights in more cases where such ties may not continue.
2.

Other Statutory Approaches to Stepparent and Other Relative
Adoptions

A few states have enacted unusual provisions dealing with stepparent and other relative adoptions. Like the RUAA and UPC, these
states recognize the adoptive family as a complete substitute for the
natural family, except in cases of stepparent adoptions. However,
ent is a relative, such as a sibling, of the deceased natural parent). The applicable provision in the pre-1990 version of the Uniform Probate Code is § 2-114.
249 See Jones, supra note 195, at 80-87 (noting desirability of maintaining the
adoptee's inheritance rights from a noncustodial natural parent who consented to the
child's adoption by the stepparent after the natural parents were divorced).
250

Rein, supra note 2, at 731 (noting that the RUAA approach is too narrow because

it does not apply to other relative adoptions).
251 See supra text accompanying notes 245-47. The UPC has received praise and
criticism for expecting and encouraging continued contact between a child and his natural relatives after a natural parent has relinquished his or her parental rights. For criticism of this aspect of the UPC approach, see supra text accompanying notes 205-10;
Hughes, supra note 22, at 346. For a favorable critique, seeJones, supra note 195, at 8087; Still-Caris, supra note 123, at 275-78.
252
See supra text accompanying notes 240-48.
253
See supra text accompanying notes 245-48.
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each of these states approaches the exception differently. Some extend the stepparent exception to other relative and even nonrelative
adoptions in limited circumstances. For example, Alaska, which
generally follows the RUAA, states that "the decree of adoption
[may] specifically provide[] for continuation of inheritance
rights. '2 54 Thus, the Alaska exception could extend to other relative or even nonrelative adoptions.
Similarly, Maine, which follows the UPC, provides that the
"child will also inherit from the natural parents and their respective
kin if the adoption decree so provides. ' 25 5 The official comment to
the statute indicates that inheritance from the natural family is normally inappropriate; however, situations exist "where such inheritance rights would seem appropriate and where the preservation of
confidentiality would not be important." 25 6 The comment indicates
that such a situation occurs when friends or relatives adopt teenagers whose parents have died.2 5 7 Thus, Maine preserves inheritance
rights from the natural family in relative adoptions and even nonrelative adoptions where appropriate. Maine has also adopted the
UPC's provision restricting dual inheritance to a single share,
2 58
whichever is larger.
New Jersey uses a discretionary approach. The applicable statute states that "[f]or good cause, the court may in the judgment provide that the rights of inheritance from or through a deceased
parent will not be affected or terminated by the adoption. ' 25 9 New
Jersey's approach is narrower than those of Alaska and Maine because it does not follow the RUAA or UPC in automatically preserving inheritance rights from the natural family in cases of stepparent
adoptions. In New Jersey, the discretionary provision is the only
means of preserving inheritance rights from the natural family.
Further, New Jersey limits the discretion given to the court.
Although the judge approving the adoption may preserve inheritance rights between the adoptee and the natural relatives, he may
do so only when the adoption occurs after the death of a natural
§§ 13.11.045(a) (Supp. 1991), 25.23.130 (Supp. 1990).

254

ALASKA STAT.

255
256
257
258

ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.

18-A, § 2-109(1) (West 1981).
18-A, § 2-109(1), Maine Comment (1979).

Id.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.

18-A, § 2-114 (1964). However, Maine has added to this

provision the following language: "[i]n cases where such an heir would take equal
shares, he shall be entitled to the equivalent of a single share. The court shall equitably
apportion the amount equivalent in value to the share denied such heir by the provisions
of this section." The comment indicates that the added language is designed to prevent
an heir from bargaining with two groups of heirs to determine under which of the two
lines of relationship he would take his share. Id.
259
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-50(a) (West Supp. 1991).
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parent. 260 The statutory language, however, permits the court to
recognize exceptions under circumstances similar to those suggested in the official comment to the Maine statute. 2 6 1 Therefore,
the New Jersey exception, like the Alaska and Maine exceptions, can
extend beyond stepparent adoptions to other relative adoptions and
possibly to nonrelative adoptions in limited circumstances.
The discretionary approaches of Alaska, Maine, and NewJersey
serve the best interests of the child by allowing the judge to maintain the child's inheritance rights from his natural family when
granting the adoption. Such discretion proves beneficial in unusual
situations like that suggested by the official comment to the Maine
statute, where teenagers are adopted by friends after the parents'
deaths. 26 2 Because these exceptions can apply to other relative and
nonrelative adoptions, as well as stepparent adoptions, they are
broader than the RUAA and UPC exceptions. However, judges are
unlikely to make great use of these exceptions, particularly in Maine,
where the official comment to the statute states that the preservation
of inheritance rights from the natural family is normally
26 3
inappropriate.
Because Alaska follows the RUAA approach and Maine follows
the UPC approach, these exceptions suffer from the same shortcom264
ings in furthering the goals of succession law as discussed above.
However, given the judicial discretion permitted under the Alaska
and Maine statutes, these provisions may work well in the situation
where teenagers are adopted by friends after their parents'
deaths.2 6 5 Unfortunately, these discretionary provisions may not
work as well in other situations. Like the legislatures drafting these
stepparent exceptions, judges do not know whether the child and
the natural relatives will, in fact, maintain contact with each other.
Because judges are unlikely to use these exceptions frequently,
these provisions have little effect on the problems of succession law
in this area.
In New Jersey, the discretionary provision is the only means of
maintaining inheritance rights from the natural family.2 6 6 By not
automatically maintaining inheritance rights in cases of stepparent
or other relative adoptions, NewJersey eliminates the frustration of
Idj
That is, when both parents die in an accident and family friends adopt the children, the NewJersey statute would permit the judge to preserve inheritance rights from
other natural relatives when granting the adoption decree.
262
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109(1), Maine Comment (1979).
263
See supra text accompanying note 256.
264
See supra text accompanying notes 249-53.
265
See supra text accompanying notes 256-57.
266
See supra text accompanying note 259.
260
261
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decedents' probable intentions where ties do not continue between
the child and the natural relatives. Yet notwithstanding this provision, New Jersey fails to preserve inheritance rights in cases where
such ties do continue. Thus, New Jersey has solved one problem at
the expense of another.
Indiana adopts a somewhat different approach. It maintains the
child's inheritance rights from the natural parent who is married to
the stepparent "as though the child had not been adopted, and from
the child's adopted parent as though the child were the natural
child." 26 7 However, Indiana does not preserve inheritance rights
from the noncustodial natural parent under any circumstances. Indiana also preserves inheritance rights from natural relatives in
other relative adoptions. Specifically,
if a person who is related to a child within the sixth degree adopts
such child, such child shall upon the occasion of each death in the
child's family have the right of inheritance through the child's natural parents or adopting parents, whichever is greater in value in
26 8
each case.
Indiana's approach is defective in two ways. First, although this approach furthers the goals of nontraditional adoptions by maintaining inheritance rights in cases of other relative adoptions, it
frustrates these same goals by not maintaining inheritance rights in
stepparent adoptions. Ideally exceptions should include all relative
adoptions. However, since stepparent adoptions constitute the majority of relative adoptions, 269 if one type is recognized and not the
other, the exception would have a greater effect if it recognized
stepparent adoptions.
Second, the Indiana exception is too broad to further the goals
of succession law effectively. Indiana presumes that contact with all
natural relatives will continue in all cases of relative adoptions.
Thus, Indiana's exception will always frustrate the decedent's intentions where no associations continue between the child and the natural relatives after a relative adoption, but will never frustrate those
intentions when ties do continue.
Florida also recognizes other relative adoptions. Florida follows the RUAA approach except it preserves inheritance rights from
a deceased natural parent only if the stepparent married the custo267 IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-8 (Bums 1989). This restriction on dual inheritance is
reinforced by IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-9 (Bums 1989) which states that "a person who
is related to the intestate through two [2] lines of relationship, though under either one
alone he might claim as next of kin, shall, nevertheless, be entitled to only one [1] share
which shall be the share based on the relationship which would entitle him to the larger
share." See also Billings v. Head, 111 N.E. 177 (Ind. 1916).

§ 29-1-2-8 (Bums 1989).

268

IND. CODE ANN.

269

See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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dial natural parent after the death of the other natural parent. 2 70 In
addition, the statute states that "[a]doption of a child by a close relative.., has no effect on the relationship between the child and the
families of the deceased natural parents." 27 1 Florida defines "close
relative" as a brother, sister, grandparent, aunt, or uncle of the
child. 27 2 By maintaining inheritance rights only when the stepparent marries the natural parent after the death of the other natural
parent, Florida's exception furthers the goals of adoption in even
fewer circumstances than the RUAA. However, by maintaining inheritance in cases of adoptions by close relatives, the Florida exception furthers the goals of adoption law in more situations than the
RUAA.
Florida's approach will further the goals of succession law
when, in fact, the adoptee maintains contact with his natural relatives. Florida assumes that such contact will continue in all adoptions occurring after the death of a natural parent. When such
contact does not occur, the approach will frustrate the goals of succession law.
New York's statute is more comprehensive. 27 3 New York preserves an adoptee's inheritance rights in cases of stepparent adoptions, whether they occur after death or divorce, as well as in cases
of other relative adoptions. 2 74 The adoptee inherits from the natural family "if (1) the decedent is the adoptive child's natural grandparent or is a descendant of such grandparent, and (2) an adoptive
parent (i) is married to the child's natural parent, (ii) is the child's
natural grandparent, or (iii) is descended from such
2 75
grandparent."
New York also restricts dual inheritance; however, unlike the
UPC, it does not allow the child to inherit under the relationship
which results in the larger share. 2 76 Instead, the statute provides
that an adoptee related to a decedent by both natural and adoptive
relationships inherits "only under the natural relationship unless
the decedent is also the adoptive parent, in which case the adoptive
child shall then be entitled to inherit pursuant to the adoptive rela27 7
tionship only."
270
271

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.108(1)(b) (West Supp. 1991).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.108(1)(c) (West Supp. 1991). Another Florida statute in-

dicates that this latter exception only applies when a close relative adopts the child upon
the death of both natural parents. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.172(2) (West Supp. 1991).
272
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.172(2) (West Supp. 1991).
273
For detailed analysis of New York law in this area, see French, supra note 189.
274
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 117.1(e) (Consol. 1979 & Supp. 1990).
275
Id.
276
See supra text accompanying note 248.
277
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117.1(e) (Consol. 1979 & Supp. 1990). See also RECOMMENDATION OF THE LAw REVISION COMM'N TO THE 1986 LEGISLATURE RELATING TO IN-
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The New York approach furthers the goals of adoption by preserving inheritance rights in cases of stepparent adoptions occurring after death or divorce, as well as in adoptions by dose
relatives. 278 The only adoptions not covered by this exception are
those occurring when a more distant relative adopts the child, or
when friends adopt a child after the death of both parents.
Like the approaches of the UPC and Florida, New York's exception may or may not further the goals of succession law. The UPC
and both states assume that contact will continue in all adoptions
covered by the exception. Like the UPC and Florida, New York
has not solved the problem but merely expanded the categories
involved.
A more complex approach also exists in California. California
probate law preserves the adoptee's inheritance rights from his natural relatives if two conditions are met:
(1) [t]he natural parent and adopted person lived together at any
time as parent and child, or the natural parent was married to or
was cohabiting with the other natural parent at the time the child
was conceived and died before the birth of the child [and] (2)
[t]he adoption was by the spouse of either of the natural
parents
2 79
or after the death of either of the natural parents.
This exception preserves inheritance rights in cases of stepparent
adoptions occurring after the death of, or relinquishment of parental rights by, a natural parent as long as the parent and child had
lived together at one time. This exception also applies to other relative and nonrelative adoptions occurring after the death of a natural
parent as long as the parent and child had lived together.
A separate provision of California adoption law also bears on
the stepparent exception. California provides the following notice
to natural parents consenting to stepparent adoptions: "[i]f you or
your child lived together at any time as parent and child, the adoption of your child by a stepparent does not affect the child's right to
inherit your property or the property of other blood relatives."2 8 0
The statute does not provide for any notice to the other natural
relatives.
HERITANCE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN ADOPTED OUT OF A CLASS BY PERSONS RELATED TO
THEM BY BLOOD OR BY MARRIAGE, STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STUDIES (1986) (citing N.Y.S.B.A., Estate and Trust Admin.

Comm. 's Response to the Law Revision Comm'n's Sponsored Bills S. 8325-A. 1031 (March 6,
1984)-InheritanceRights of Adopted Children, Sept. 11, 1984, at 3-4). The commission
thought that most people would want the child to take in the natural relationship. This
provision also prevents the use of relative adoptions to alter the shares of distributees or
beneficiaries. See id.
278 See supra text accompanying notes 273-75.
279 CAL. PROB. CODE § 6408 (West Special Pamphlet 1991).
280 CAL. CIV. CODE § 227.44 (West Special Pamphlet 1991).

1228

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1188

The California approach furthers the goals of adoption by recognizing that contact often continues between the child and the natural family, and by preserving inheritance rights that occur after the
death of, or relinquishment by, a natural parent, if the parent and
child lived together at any time. 28 1 Though the statute does not
specifically refer to other relative adoptions, the effect of the statutory language is to preserve the child's inheritance rights from the
natural family when relatives adopt the child after the death of a
natural parent. Unlike the New York exception, the California exception also permits the preservation of inheritance rights from the
natural family where friends adopt children after the deaths of both
parents.
California's approach, like most of the others, assumes that
contact will continue in all adoptions that meet the statutory requirements. When this statutory prediction is accurate, the exception furthers the goals of succession law. However, when contact
does not continue, the exception frustrates those same goals. Relinquishing natural parents receive notification, which prevents any unfair surprise; however, other natural relatives receive no such
notice. 28 2 When contact does not continue, the intentions of these
decedents may be frustrated.
Finally, Pennsylvania has a very different approach to stepparent and other relative adoptions. Pennsylvania provides that a stepparent adoption has no effect on the relationship between the child
and the natural parent married to the adopting stepparent. 28 3 However, the noncustodial natural parent's relationship with the child is
28 4
conclusively terminated by the adoption.
In addition, the statute creates an exception for relationships
between the child and other natural relatives. The statute states that
the adopted child is considered the child of the adoptive parents
and not of the natural parents "except in distributing the estate of a
natural kin, other than the natural parent, who has maintained a
family relationship with the adopted person."2 8 5 The 1976 Official
Comment states that this is a "limited exception" which "recognizes
that family relationships frequently continue for grandparents and
See supra text accompanying notes 279-80.
See supra text accompanying note 280.
283
If a natural parent marries the adopting parent, "the adopted person for purposes of inheritance by, from and through him shall also be considered the issue of such
natural parent." 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2108 (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added). The
1947 Official Comment to this statue states that this provision only applies to the natural
parent who is married to the adopting stepparent. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2108
(Supp. 1990) Official Cmt. (1947).
284
Id.
281

282

285

Id.
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others where an adoption may have occurred after the death or divorce of a parent." 28 6 This exception could apply to stepparent,
other relative, and possibly nonrelative adoptions, as long as the deceased natural kin had maintained the requisite family relationship
with the child.
By permitting an adoptee to inherit from a natural relative
whenever a familial relationship is maintained between them, Pennsylvania furthers the goals of adoption law. Although the Official
Comment to the statute states that this is a "limited exception," the
language would preserve inheritance rights in relative and nonrelative adoptions, as well as stepparent adoptions. 2 87 The goals of
adoption law are frustrated, however, because Pennsylvania never
28 8
permits the child to inherit from a noncustodial natural parent.
Thus, Pennsylvania fails to recognize that a family relationship can
exist between the natural parent and the child after an adoption. In
addition, because this exception is not limited to stepparent and
other relative adoptions, it may frustrate the goals of traditional
adoptions by encouraging potentially intrusive contact by natural
28 9
relatives.
The Pennsylvania approach also more successfully promotes
the goals of succession law because it tailors these exceptions to fit
the particular circumstances better than any of the other approaches. The family relationship requirement insures that an
adoptee only shares in the decedent's estate when it comports with
the probable intention of the decedent. In addition, this requirement insures that the adoptee and natural relatives are easily located, thereby promoting certainty of titles. However, by never
permitting the child to inherit from a noncustodial natural parent,
Pennsylvania frustrates the decedent's probable intentions where
that parent did maintain a family relationship with the child.
The Pennsylvania approach is unusual because it introduces
discretion into succession law, thereby altering its traditional system
of fixed rules. Critics fear that such discretion will result in unpredictable and nonuniform results. 290 Further, critics speculate that
administrative costs will increase as potential heirs battle with estate
administrators over the definition of "family relationship." 29 1 Nevertheless, only the Pennsylvania approach recognizes that "no single rule will produce fair results on the question of adopted child
286
287
288
289
290
291

20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2108 (Supp. 1990) Official Cmt. (1976).
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2108 (Supp. 1990) Official Cmt. (1947).
1&

See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
See French, supra note 189, at 1039.
See Lovas, supra note 32, at 369 n.112.
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inheritance rights in all cases or even in a large majority of
cases." 2 92 Only Pennsylvania recognizes that affective ties often, but
not always, continue between the child and the natural relatives after stepparent and other relative adoptions.
IV
SUGGESTED STATUTORY CHANGES

Although the Pennsylvania exception is generally satisfactory,
certain modifications are necessary to improve this approach. First,
the exception should only apply to stepparent and other relative
adoptions. Currently, the statute does not include such a limitation,
and as a result, invites potentially intrusive contact by the natural
family in traditional adoptions. Limiting the exception will insure
that the statute furthers the goals of both traditional and nontraditional adoptions.
Second, the exception should preserve the adoptee's inheritance rights from his natural parent when that parent has maintained a family relationship with the child. This requirement of a
family relationship insures that a child will not inherit from a parent
who relinquishes custody and no longer considers the child as his
own. However, where contact is maintained between the child and
the natural parent, the child will share in the intestate estate. Either
way, the result will implement the decedent's probable intentions.
Third, Pennsylvania should include a discretionary provision
similar to those of Alaska, Maine, and New Jersey, permitting the
judge to grant the adoption decree to preserve the adoptee's inheritance rights. 293 This provision is necessary in unusual situations
similar to that suggested by the official comment to the Maine statute 294-where both natural parents of older children die and friends
of the parents adopt the children.
Finally, the Pennsylvania approach should restrict dual inheritance. A child who is related to a decedent by both natural and
adoptive relationships should inherit the share based on the adoptive relationship. 2 95 This approach is more equitable to other heirs
292

Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills, 22

U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 917, 937 (1989) (suggesting that states enact an approach similar to
that of Pennsylvania in order to grant inheritance rights to stepchildren).
293
See supra text accompanying notes 254-61.
294
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109(1), Maine Cmt. (1979). See text accompanying notes 256-57.
295
For a list of states that take this approach, see supra note 227; see also Jones, supra
note 195, at 94 noting that
[t]he principle of treating the adopted and natural children of the adoptive stepparent equally requires ... that the adopted child be treated the
same as a natural child, whether or not that treatment would give the
adopted child a larger or smaller share of the decedent's or testator's

1992]
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and eliminates the resentment of family members that might result
if the adoptee could inherit either from both relationships or from
the relationship that results in the largest inheritance. 296
This modified Pennsylvania approach will encounter opposition
by those opposed to the introduction of discretion into the area of
succession law. 29 7 As Professor Glendon has noted, succession law
is "the traditional stronghold of fixed rules." 2 98 However, the
amount of discretion involved in this modified Pennsylvania approach is minimal and will be counterbalanced by the more accurate
implementation of the probable intentions of the decedent and the
assurance that certainty of titles and ease of estate administration
will result. 2 99 Further, the introduction of limited discretion into
succession law is acceptable and perhaps inevitable when reconciling two bodies of law-adoption law, which is highly discretionary-and succession law, which is largely nondiscretionary and rulebound.
CONCLUSION

State intestacy law regulating the succession rights of children
adopted by stepparents or other relatives is decidedly nonuniform
and inconsistent. Given the importance of this issue, and the large
number of adoptions involved, state legislatures should re-evaluate
estate than had the child not been adopted "but recommending in her
model statute that the child take the larger share in order to protect "the
property rights of those individuals which could be disrupted by an adoption over which they had no authority to grant or withhold consent".
296 But see Jones, supra note 195, at 94 (noting that either approach can result in
animosity between adopted and natural children).
297
The introduction of discretion into succession law has already occurred to a limited extent. "The doctrine of equitable adoption, for example, requires the courts to
inquire into facts surrounding the 'adoptive' parent-child relationship in order to determine whether a contract to adopt, and other elements of the doctrine, have been established." Mahoney, supra note 292, at 936 (suggesting the use of a discretionary
approach in order to grant inheritance rights to stepchildren). Equitable adoptions occur when a family takes in an unrelated child at a young age and raises the child as if he
were their own. Often these children grow up believing that they are the biological or
adopted child of the foster parents. Sometimes the foster parents try to adopt the child
but are unsuccessful because of a legal impediment. Upon the death of the last surviving
foster parent, the child learns that he has no inheritance rights. See Rein, supra note 2, at
766-70. "To correct the injustice that would result were the intestacy laws woodenly
applied, most jurisdictions grant equitable relief... permitting [the child] to take the
child's share he would have inherited had the foster parent legally adopted him." Id. at
767.
298
Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretionin ContemporaryFamily Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REv. 1165, 1185 (1986).
299
Further, additional modifications to this approach may appease such critics. For
example, the statute could provide, as does the California statute, that inheritance rights
from the natural family are preserved only if the natural parent lived with the child at
one time. Such a requirement may provide an objective means of ensuring that affective
ties exist.
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and revise their laws in this area in order to better effectuate the
goals of both modem adoption law and modem succession law.
As legislatures rethink the law in this area, they should recognize that relative adoptions in general, and stepparent adoptions in
particular, involve factual circumstances and policy concerns different from those involved in a typical adoption. Although little empirical data on the patterns and impact of stepparent adoptions exists,
making absolute conclusions impossible, research has indicated that
the differences between traditional and relative adoptions are real
and important, and that adoption practices should differ
accordingly.
In a traditional adoption, legislators should promote the modem policy of a fresh start for adoptees, and should continue the
trends toward recognizing the adoptive family as a complete substitute for the natural family. In such cases, the inheritance rights
from and through the natural parents should be completely severed.
This severance will foster the adoptee's assimilation into the adoptive family and prevent frustration of an intestate decedent's probable intentions.
However, in the case of a relative adoption, including stepparent adoptions, neither preservation nor severance of inheritance
rights from and through the natural parents should occur automatically. Instead, inheritance rights should be contingent on maintaining a familial relationship between the natural family and the
adoptee. Consistent with the goals of modern adoption law, this
approach recognizes continued ties only when they are in the child's
best interests. This approach would also further the goals of modern succession law by preserving inheritance rights only in situations where the decedent probably intended that the adoptee would
share in the intestate estate.
Lisa A. Fullert

t I wish to thank Professor Gregory S. Alexander for his encouragement and his
many helpful suggestions. All errors, of course, are mine alone.

